An Essentially Syntactic and Formal Theory Is Still Possible

Abstract

ABSTRACT:In 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani, and Goodwin indicated four reasons why a basically syntactic approach explaining the human inferential activity is hard to accept nowadays. However, in this paper, I try to show that such reasons do not reveal real problems for the syntactic frameworks, and that most of the difficulties related to them have already been addressed by the literature on cognitive science and considered to be clearly surmountable from a mainly formal perspective. In this way, I argue that it is still possible to claim that syntax plays an important role in human thought. RESUMEN:En 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani y Goodwin plantearon cuatro razones por las que, en nuestros días, es complejo aceptar un enfoque básicamente sintáctico para explicar la actividad inferencial humana. No obstante, en este trabajo, intento mostrar que tales razones no revelan problemas reales en los marcos sintácticos y que la mayoría de las dificultades relacionadas con ellas ya han sido analizadas en la literatura de la ciencia cognitiva y consideradas como claramente superables desde una perspectiva principalmente formal. De este modo, argumento que todavía es posible defender que la sintaxis desempeña un rol importante en el pensamiento humano. RÉSUMÉ:En 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani et Goodwin ont indiqué quatre raisons pour les quelles une approche essentiellement syntaxique expliquant l'activité inférentielle humaine est difficile à accepter de nos jours. Cependant, dans cet article, j'essaie de montrer que de telles raisons ne révèlent pas de problèmes réels pour les cadres syntaxiques et que la plupart des difficultés qui les concernent ont déjà été abordées dans la littérature sur les sciences cognitives et considérées comme clairement surmontables à partir d'une perspective essentiellement formelle. De cette façon, je soutiens qu'il est encore possible de prétendre que la syntaxe joue un rôle important dans la pensée humaine.

Las formas lógicas reales correspondientes a las diez interpretaciones del condicional

“…This is the manner modulation works in general in the mental models theory. Nevertheless, what is truly interesting for this paper in this regard is that, as it is also accounted for or can be derived from papers such as those indicated (i.e., Johnson-Laird &Byrne, 2002, andLópez-Astorga, 2016), all of this has consequences related to schemata such as Modus Ponendo Ponens, Modus Tollendo Tollens, Affirming the Consequent Fallacy, and Denying the Antecedent Fallacy. As it is well known, in classical propositional calculus, the two former are correct and the two latter are wrong, and that is easy to note if an habitual and non-modulated conditional is considered, that is, if a conditional to which [I] can be assigned is considered.…”

“…The general idea of such works (another example in this regard can be the paper of López-Astorga, 2017b), whose overall framework will be called, from now on, using the acronyms MS (coming from the expression «Mental Syntax», which is used in order to differentiate this syntax from the syntax of thought supported by the mental logic theory), really emanates from essential theses of other approach, the mental models theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015). This last theory is actually a rival framework to the mental logic theory, the main reason of that being that the former explicitly rejects the idea that there is logical forms in the human mind corresponding to the sentences in natural language, and holds that people only think by analyzing models that represent reality and are iconic (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2010).…”

“…Then, from those ten interpretations, logical formulae with just conjunctions, disjunctions, and negations corresponding to them will be built. This part of the paper will not be absolutely new, since in the literature logical forms for some of such interpretations are to be found (e.g., López-Astorga, 2017b). However, the novelty will be here that all of the ten interpretations mentioned above will be given logical forms in a systematic way and that, as said, this will be done resorting only to conjunctions, disjunctions, and negations.…”

“…Furthermore, as an illustrative datum, it can be added that, although, as stated, the literature seems to make it evident that the mental logic theory is not absolutely right, it has also been argued that, in certain particular aspects, it does work, and its predictions in connection to the ten types of sentences detected by the mental models theory have been analyzed using hypothetical problems with Modus Ponendo Ponens, Modus Tollendo Tollens, Affirming the Consequent Fallacy, and Denying the Antecedent Fallacy as well, the result of those analyses being that, equally, the predictions are the same (López-Astorga, 2016). So, it could also be said that, while there are some reasons to think that is not so, even if the mental logic theory correctly described human conditional thought, that would not demonstrate that MS does not hold either, since the predictions match in this case too.…”

“…As it can be noted and is explained in a number of works (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002;López-Astorga, 2016), what happens is that the scenario Possible (not-p & q) that was in [I] has disappeared in [III], the reason of that being evident: it is not possible that there is a fire without oxygen. However, in the same way, another scenario has been added: Possible (p & not-q).…”