Accountability and opposition to globalization in international assemblies

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Tabea PalmtagUniversity of Zürich, Switzerland AbstractAdvocates of a global democratic parliament have expressed hopes that this would not only legitimize global governance in procedural terms, but also bring about more cosmopolitan policies. They point to the European Parliament as an example of a successful real existing democratic parliament beyond the state with cosmopolitan intent. We analyse plenary debates in the United Nations General Assembly and the European Parliament about the issues of climate change, human rights, migration, trade and European integration between 2004 and 2011 to study the nature of opposition to cosmopolitanism within these two assemblies. We find more vocal and better-organized opposition to cosmopolitanism in the European Parliament than in the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate the plausibility that direct and more proportional mechanisms of delegation and accountability in the case of the European Parliament account for this observed difference. Should further research confirm these initial findings, advocates of a global democratic parliament may find that an empowered democratic World Parliament would support less cosmopolitan policies than the current United Nations General Assembly.

Transnational Representation in EU National Parliaments: Concept, Case Study, Research Agenda

“…In doing so, we draw on Pieter de Wilde's (2013) 'Representative Claims Analysis' (RCA) (cf. de Wilde et al, 2014Wilde et al, , 2015. This method has been ground-breaking in combining Saward's (2010) theory of representative claims-making with the empirical approach of political claims analysis developed by Statham, (1999, 2010).…”

The dog that did not bark: the EU and the clash between sovereignty and justice in the International Criminal Court

“…To support this conclusion we have also taken a closer look at debates in the European Parliament on the ICC (see more on this below). The Parliament is an important venue for political disagreement, and has been found to be open to the contestation of the international liberal order and its more cosmopolitan facets (De Wilde, Junk and Palmtag 2016). This suggests that if doubts were casted against the ICC, they would be noticed in the Parliament.…”