This article introduces the concept of the ‘Multilevel Parliamentary Field’ as a means for analysing the structure of democratic representation in the European Union (EU). This concept is warranted for several reasons. First, the multilevel configuration that makes up the EU contains two channels of democratic representation: one directly through the European Parliament, the other indirectly through the national parliaments and governments. These two channels are likely to persist side by side; hence, both the European and the national parliaments can claim to represent ‘the people’ in EU decision-making. Second, this structure of representation is in many respects without precedent; it does not fit established concepts of democratic representation derived from the nation-state or from international relations, such as a federal two-channel system or a parliamentary network. Third, the representative bodies in the EU are interlinked, also across levels. Up until now, no proper conceptual apparatus has been devised that can capture the distinctive traits of this EU multilevel representative system, and help to assess its democratic quality. The concept of the Multilevel Parliamentary Field fills both these tasks. It serves as a heuristic device to integrate the empirical analysis of the different forms of democratic representation in the EU’s multilevel system, and it provides new angles for analysing the democratic challenges that this system faces.
This article explores the implications of the financial crisis for the relationship between monetary integration and democratic government in the European Union (EU). As the crisis has exposed the original balance that economic and monetary union (EMU) sought to maintain between monetary integration and policy diversity to be unsustainable, the eurozone is put before the choice of one of three governance models: executive federalism, democratic federalization or EMU dissolution. Notably, these three governance models perfectly illustrate Dani Rodrik's 'trilemma of the world economy', which maintains that of the three goods -economic (and monetary) integration, the nation-state and democratic politics -one will always have to give. In light of this, the article concludes that the present course towards executive federalism can be justified for preventing euro dissolution and recognizing the value of national self-government. Nevertheless, it threatens to come at a democratic price. Hence, it is imperative to consider possible flanking measures that can mitigate this effect.
How has the new structure of European Union (EU) economic governance affected the ability of parliaments (national and European) to scrutinize and control economic policy? Departing from the premise that executive power needs to be matched by appropriate parliamentary control, this contribution argues that parliamentary powers have been compromised in EU economic governance. Although budgetary powers remain formally at the national level, governments' decisions have become constrained and national parliaments find themselves on the losing side of a reinforced two-level game. This loss in parliamentary powers is not compensated at the European level, as at that level political authority is effectively left suspended between the national governments, who are unaccountable as a collective, and the European Commission, which lacks a political mandate of its own. Against this background, a final section identifies guidelines for organizing parliamentary accountability in settings, like EU economic governance, in which executive power has come to be shared across levels.
This paper examines the democratic legitimacy of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the international financial crisis hit the euro area. From its inception, EMU has been marked by an asymmetry as its monetary pillar relied on output legitimacy while its economic pillar relied essentially on input legitimacy at the national level. The crisis severely challenged EMU's output legitimacy, which led to the establishment of new European-level institutions. We analyse the European Stability Mechanism, the European Semester, and Banking Union to take stock of their powers and the ways that these are balanced by mechanisms of legitimacy. Our main finding is that the intergovernmental and output-oriented approach that originally informed the legitimacy of EMU has remained prevalent after the crisis. However, as the three domainsin varying degreesaddress questions that are essentially political, we argue that the channels for input legitimacy at the European level remain deficient.
This article examines political party behaviour around the referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005. Starting from the presumption that this behaviour needs to be analysed in the light of the domestic government-opposition dynamics, a set of hypotheses on the causes and consequences of party behaviour in EU Treaty referendums is developed and reviewed for the EU member states in which a referendum was held or anticipated. As it turns out, with the exception of some right-conservative parties, all mainstream parties endorsed the Constitutional Treaty. However, because significant proportions of opposition party supporters are bound to go to the ‘No’ side, government parties are eventually crucial in securing a majority in favour of EU Treaty revisions.
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