Transnational Representation in EU National Parliaments: Concept, Case Study, Research Agenda

Kinski, Lucy; Crum, Ben

doi:10.1177/0032321719848565

Cited by 24 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Particularly for the leftwing opposition parties, these transnational activities are motivated by an awareness that they 'cannot go it alone' when they demand a different course of action on EU matters. This supports the idea that there is a transnational dimension to debates about European issues (Kinski & Crum, 2019). At the same time, the findings also show that transnational party activities to acquire resources for domestic purposes are more important than activities to contest EU affairs across borders.…”

Section: Limits Potentials and Threats For Transnational Party Activities In The Eusupporting

confidence: 81%

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People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. Introduction Setting the scene: National parties and democracy in the European UnionNational political parties are crucial actors in democratic systems. By participating in elections, they are the most important organisations that link citizens to the institutions of the state. Parties need to respond to the preferences and demands of citizens. And, if they win elections, they need to channel such preferences and demands into proposals for government policies (Sartori, [1976, p. 25). Fundamentally, then, in democratic systems, parties perform the function of "allowing the governed to express their demands freely and in such a way as to render them effective within the very machinery of government" (Sartori, 2005, p. 30). The performance of this function can, at heart, not be replaced by another institution, organisation, or group of actors (p. 28).In a well-functioning representative democracy, also the policies of the European Union (EU) would ultimately be the result of the expression of citizens' preferences (Hix, Kreppel & Noury, 2003, p. 310). The EU institutions take highly important policy decisions in many areas. From the area of foreign and security policy, in which they have limited, but special competences; to areas such as the internal market and regional policy, in which they share competences with the member states; and areas like trade, competition, and customs, in which they have exclusive competences. At the same time, member states retain competences to make legislation in other areas, including health and education. The EU is thus fundamentally a 'multi-level system': decisions are made both at the national, member state level and the supranational, EU level. These levels are inextricably linked to each other (Scharpf, 1994;.The democratic system of the EU is, however, particular. Most importantly, the "electoral connection" between citizens and parties at the European level is weak (Lindberg, Rasmussen & Warntjen, 2008, p. 1108. Granted, the European Parliament (EP) has become an important, directly elected instit...

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Section: Limits Potentials and Threats For Transnational Party Activities In The Eusupporting

confidence: 81%

“…What role do national parties play in such activist networks on EU affairs? And how do they link such networks to debates and decisions in national parliaments (see also Kinski & Crum, 2019)?…”

Section: Directions For Future Research On Transnational Party Activities In the Eumentioning

confidence: 99%

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“…When debating decarbonisation or energy transition, do they speak on behalf of businesses and farmers, or do they stress the needs of vulnerable population groups and future generations? Do they claim to represent European citizens or member state interests on climate action (Kinski & Crum, 2020;Vogeler et al, 2021)? Finally, the justification dimension identifies the different frames MEPs use to justify why they advocate for or against certain policy ambitions.…”

Section: Methodological Approach and Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Framing Climate Policy Ambition in the European Parliament

Kinski

Servent

2022

PaG

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The European Union’s climate policy is considered quite ambitious. This has led to a growing interest among political scientists investigating the European Parliament’s ability to negotiate such ambitious climate legislation. These studies generally focus on the voting behaviour of members of the European Parliament, which allows us to know more about their positions when it comes to accepting or rejecting legislative acts. However, we know surprisingly little about how they debate and justify their positions in Parliament. In these debates, members of the European Parliament not only identify the problem (i.e., climate change and its adverse effects) but also discuss potential solutions (i.e., their willingness or ambition to fight and adapt to climate change). In addition, plenary debates are ideal for making representative claims based on citizens’ interests on climate action. Therefore, this article aims to understand how climate policy ambitions are debated in the European Parliament and whose interests are represented. We propose a new manual coding scheme for climate policy ambitions in parliamentary debate and employ it in climate policy debates in the ninth European Parliament (2019–present). In doing so, this article makes a methodological contribution to operationalising climate policy ambition from a parliamentary representation and legitimation perspective. We find debating patterns that connect quite detailed ambitions with clear representative claims and justifications. There is more agreement on what to do than how to get there, with divides emerging based on party, ideological, and member-state characteristics.

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“…This could mean both alerting national Parliaments about the long‐term external consequences of the government’s macroeconomic policies, but also about the lack of coordination on the part of other MS. This additional democratic function of IFIs entails the opening up of each national public sphere, in order to allow different demoi to form dispositions and attitudes towards the macroeconomic choices of other countries and counterbalance the current segmentation of public debates ‐ similarly to what is happening in some national legislatures whose MPs take into consideration the interests of other EU MS’ citizens when advancing their claims (Kinski and Crum 2020). Indeed, to the extent that the main institutions for transnational coordination are gatherings of executives who report to their own national Parliaments the results of their meetings, the macroeconomic strategies of other demoi will continue to be seen as alien wills that externalize risks on other demoi .…”

Section: Expertise and Democracy In The Fiscal Domainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differentiated Fiscal Surveillance and the Democratic Promise of Independent Fiscal Institutions in the Economic and Monetary Union

Merlo

Fasone

2021

Swiss Political Sci Review

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The post‐crisis reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have met with skepticism toward their democratic credentials. This certainly applies to the requirement to set up Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs). Drawing on Pettit’s model of republican legitimacy, this paper argues however that IFIs can indirectly increase the democratic character of national fiscal policy while preserving Member States’ autonomy. Such a democratic contribution is further facilitated by nationally differentiated implementation of the EU rules regarding the heterogeneous design and powers of IFIs. Based on a comparative analysis of selected Member States’ “elaboration discretion” in defining the organisation and the mandate of IFIs, the article highlights that these features reflect the variety of constitutional settings at domestic level. It is concluded that this heterogeneity amounts to a form of differentiated integration which allows for a better navigation of the trade‐off between the persistence of fiscal policy externalities and the reduction in national autonomy.

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Transnational Representation in EU National Parliaments: Concept, Case Study, Research Agenda

Cited by 24 publications

References 38 publications

With a little help from our friends

With a little help from our friends

Framing Climate Policy Ambition in the European Parliament

Differentiated Fiscal Surveillance and the Democratic Promise of Independent Fiscal Institutions in the Economic and Monetary Union

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