A Unified Social Ontology

Abstract

Abstract:Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rules or as equilibria of strategic games. We argue that these two approaches can be unified within an encompassing theory based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form 'if X then do Y'. We then criticize Searle's claim that constitutive rules of the form 'X counts as Y in C' are fundamental building blocks for institutions, showing that such rules can be derived from regulative rules by introducing new institutional terms. Institutional terms are introduced for economy of thought, but are not necessary for the creation of social reality.

Genuinely Constitutive Rules

“…In the most orthodox account of constitutive rules they are characterized by their form and opposed to regulative rules, but there are also alternative views that emphasize that constitutive rules have a strong normative aspect of determining what should (not) or may be done within the practice (cf. Ransdell 1973;Hindriks 2009;Hindriks and Guala 2014;Guala and Hindriks 2015;Kaluziński 2018b). These accounts face a challenge: they need to provide some new characterization of constitutive rules that do not blur the distinction of constitutive rules from other types of rules.…”

“…These accounts face a challenge: they need to provide some new characterization of constitutive rules that do not blur the distinction of constitutive rules from other types of rules. Most notable accounts of Hindriks (2009), Hindriks and Guala (2014), Guala and Hindriks (2015) steer in the direction of "constitutive rules reductionism:" they claim that constitutive rules are reducible to regulative ones and their sole function is to provide us with labels that are referring to statuses established by regulative rules. Their role is purely practical/mnemonic.…”

“…Arguments made by Hindriks (2009), Hindriks and Guala (2014), Guala and Hindriks (2015), and Giddens (1984) may seem good, but they miss something important. Let me start with rather an uncontroversial claim that it is not the case that there is some analogy between rules of games and constitutive rules in general, but rather if there are constitutive rules, rules of games are paradigm examples of them.…”

“…Summarising, even if Guala and Hindriks (2015) or Giddens (1984) are right to claim that rules that traditionally have been called "constitutive" are reducible to regulative rules, and, then, even paradigm example of regulative rules appears to fit into the slogan "if there were no rules, there would be no practice," it is not the case that we cannot distinguish genuinely and trivially constitutive rules. Genuinely constitutive rules are part of multi-layer practices.…”

“…"In C, do X!"). If it is the case, constitutive rules are indeed reducible to regulative ones and their function is, at best, practical/mnemonic (Hindriks and Guala 2014;Guala and Hindriks 2015). According to Hindriks, constitutive rules provide us with labels of statuses established by regulative rules: "there is an underlying reality that constitutive rules serve to make apparent" (Hindriks 2009, 237).…”