Genuinely Constitutive Rules

Kaluziński, Bartosz

doi:10.31577/orgf.2019.26403

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…27 Searle (2015) claims that clearly conventional practices, like driving on the right or rules of etiquette, are not rule-constituted kinds or "institutions"; cf. also Kaluziński (2019) on "trivial" vs. "genuine" constitutive rules. Searle doesn't provide any good reason for this; he just says that they don't "generate deontologies in the way of institutions like private property" (ibid., 511).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds

García‐Carpintero

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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The paper distinguishes between two conceptions of kinds defined by constitutive rules, the one suggested by Searle, and the one invoked by Williamson to define assertion. Against recent arguments to the contrary by Maitra, Johnson and others, it argues for the superiority of the latter in the first place as an account of games. On this basis, the paper argues that the alleged disanalogies between real games and language games suggested in the literature in fact don't exist. The paper relies on Rawls's distinction between types ("blueprints", as Rawls called them) of practices and institutions defined by constitutive rules, and those among them that are actually in force, and hence are truly normative; it defends along Rawlsian lines that a plurality of norms apply to actual instances of rule-constituted practices, and uses this Rawlsian line to block the examples that Maitra, Johnson and others provide to sustain their case.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds

García‐Carpintero

2021

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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“…Obviously, there need to be syntactical rules as well. There are numerous works (Kaluziński, 2019b; Marmor, 2007; Roversi, 2014, to name a few more recent ones; however, the idea has been floated in the social ontology and philosophy of sport since Schwyzer, 1969) that emphasise the fact that rule‐constituted practices or institutions are usually quite complex entities. There is more to the practice than a set of rules.…”

Section: Consent and Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Kaluziński

2023

Theoria

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In this paper, I focus on the idea that language is a rule‐constituted and rule‐governed practice. This notion has been criticised recently. It has been claimed that, even if linguistic meaning is determined by rules, these rules are not genuinely normative because they do not govern actions within the practice by themselves. It has been emphasised that one needs to consent (e.g., has relevant intention or desire) to be a part of that practice. First, I distinguish between two issues: (1) How do rules come to life? (and the answer to that question is by enactment or communal acceptance), and (2) does being assessed by the standards set by the rules require some form of consent for one's actions to be evaluated by these standards? Then, I demonstrate how, by introducing the notion of “default normativity”, one can defend the idea that there are normative practices that are constituted and governed by rules and that language is one of them.

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Genuinely Constitutive Rules

Cited by 2 publications

References 9 publications

How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds

How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

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