2020
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-32618-0_2
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Institutions and Functions

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Cited by 2 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, although the meaning of "marriage" may be partly indeterminate, we are currently provoked not only to distinguish fair from unfair marriages, considering the ways in which coordination equilibrium occurs within and the quality one has with regard to the relations among the subjects the institution coordinates, but also to ask how much marriage can change by remaining the same institution (Guala and Hindriks 2020). The question does not only regard the extension of the right to marry to gay and lesbian people but also the functions people reserve for their marriage and the meanings invested in it.…”
Section: Indeterminacy and Changingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, although the meaning of "marriage" may be partly indeterminate, we are currently provoked not only to distinguish fair from unfair marriages, considering the ways in which coordination equilibrium occurs within and the quality one has with regard to the relations among the subjects the institution coordinates, but also to ask how much marriage can change by remaining the same institution (Guala and Hindriks 2020). The question does not only regard the extension of the right to marry to gay and lesbian people but also the functions people reserve for their marriage and the meanings invested in it.…”
Section: Indeterminacy and Changingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It captures very broadly why agents ought to conform to a specific institutional rule based on their instrumental rationality, although it completely neglects the details of the decision‐making process, psychology, and societal influences. Therefore, the model offers excellent tools for representing the coordinative and cooperative structure of institutional interactions and helps us understand their function and persistence (Guala & Hindriks, 2020; Pettit, 1996; Sober, 1983). Peter ought to conform with the norm of silence because it fulfils his preferences after reflecting on all the potential costs associated with other options.…”
Section: The Cost‐based Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The whole institutional impact on conforming or violating behaviour rests on a single parameter of the interaction. Although this approach provides several advantages in analysing institutional emergence and persistence (Guala & Hindriks, 2020; Hindriks & Guala, 2021), it may require a conceptual shift to make it more suitable for explaining motivations and processes leading to variations in conforming or violating institutional behaviour. The cost‐based model describes several different cognitive processes and an individual's motivations only at the aggregate level of how they translate their power into the relative value change in one's utility function.…”
Section: The Limits Of Costsmentioning
confidence: 99%