Abstract:A material simple is a material object that has no proper parts. Some philosophers have argued for the possibility of extended simples. Some have even argued for the possibility of heterogeneous simples or simples that have intrinsic variations across their surfaces. There is a puzzle, though, that is meant to show that extended, heterogeneous simples are impossible. Although several plausible responses have been given to this puzzle, I wish to reopen the case against extended, heterogeneous simples. In this p… Show more
“…For someone who believes that extendedness is intrinsic, however, ESRs are thoroughly mysterious-what makes the difference, on the intrinsic view of extendedness, between an ESR and a point? This mysteriousness is evidenced by our discussion in Section 4, wherein we see that EE clarifies the puzzling cases of Kleinschmidt (2016) and Spencer (2010). Since Kleinschmidt's and Spencer's cases are so puzzling, that EE solves the puzzles is a good reason for a believer in ESRs to believe EE.…”
Section: A Non-standard View Of Extendednessmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…So far none of this shows that there is any problem raised for Spencer's (2010) argument. We think there is, though, another reason to reject Spencer's premise (1) given EE and Intrinsicality of Location.(1) If it is possible that there is a heterogeneous simple that is exactly located at an extended composite region of space, then it is possible that a heterogeneous simple is exactly located at an extended simple region of space.…”
Section: Putting Esrs To Workmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…In what follows we outline two recent arguments due to Kleinschmidt (2016) and Spencer (2010), whose soundness, we argue, depends on accepting the standard, strongly intrinsic, characterisation of extendedness. The arguments proceed as follows:…”
“…For someone who believes that extendedness is intrinsic, however, ESRs are thoroughly mysterious-what makes the difference, on the intrinsic view of extendedness, between an ESR and a point? This mysteriousness is evidenced by our discussion in Section 4, wherein we see that EE clarifies the puzzling cases of Kleinschmidt (2016) and Spencer (2010). Since Kleinschmidt's and Spencer's cases are so puzzling, that EE solves the puzzles is a good reason for a believer in ESRs to believe EE.…”
Section: A Non-standard View Of Extendednessmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…So far none of this shows that there is any problem raised for Spencer's (2010) argument. We think there is, though, another reason to reject Spencer's premise (1) given EE and Intrinsicality of Location.(1) If it is possible that there is a heterogeneous simple that is exactly located at an extended composite region of space, then it is possible that a heterogeneous simple is exactly located at an extended simple region of space.…”
Section: Putting Esrs To Workmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…In what follows we outline two recent arguments due to Kleinschmidt (2016) and Spencer (2010), whose soundness, we argue, depends on accepting the standard, strongly intrinsic, characterisation of extendedness. The arguments proceed as follows:…”
“…See Spencer, . There are other odd consequences if simples are unextended but the smallest regions of space are extended.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One might respond that extended objects can be conceptually divided into a left half and a right half, and conceivably anything that has a left half and a right half could in principle lose one of those halves. For more on this, see Spencer, .…”
Mereological nihilism is the view that no objects have proper parts. Despite how counter‐intuitive it is, it is taken quite seriously, largely because it solves a number of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects – or so its proponents claim. In this article, I show that for every puzzle that mereological nihilism solves, there is a similar puzzle that (a) it doesn’t solve, and (b) every other solution to the original puzzle does solve. Since the solutions to the new puzzles apply just as well to the old puzzles, the old puzzles provide no motivation to be a mereological nihilist.
Mereological nihilists are faced with a difficult challenge: explaining ordinary talk about material objects. Popular paraphrase strategies involve plurals, arrangements of particles, or fictions. In this paper, a new paraphrase strategy is put forward that has distinct advantages over its rivals: it is compatible with gunk and emergent properties of macro-objects. e only assumption is a commitment to a liberal view of the nature of simples; the nihilist must be willing to accept the possibility of heterogeneous extended simples. e author suggests reinterpreting the parthood and composition relations as modal. According to this paraphrase, composition is a kind of counterpart relation. e author shows that one can accept that mereological nihilism is metaphysically necessary, while endorsing all the claims of classical mereology. As a result, the nihilists are in exactly the same position as the classical mereologist when it comes to explaining talk about ordinary objects, but without the additional ontology.
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