I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things have properties that are 'something over and above' the properties of their parts. As the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in the nihilist's ontology to instantiate emergent properties -or so the challenge goes. However, I argue that some simples (taken together) can collectively instantiate an emergent property, so the nihilist's ontology can in fact accommodate emergent properties. Furthermore, I show that employing plural instantiation does not bloat the nihilist's ontology or ideology.
The argument from ontological emergenceHere I defend mereological nihilism against a challenge from ontological emergence. §1 briefly explains nihilism and ontological emergence then outlines the argument against nihilism from the existence of emergent properties (the No Bearers argument). In §2 I argue that the best solution is for the nihilist to employ plural instantiation, holding that emergent properties are collectively instantiated by multiple simples. §3 weighs up the ontological and ideological cost of introducing plural quantification -necessary for making sense of plural instantiation -into the nihilist's theory. I conclude that the cost is negligible and so does not negate any of the claimed ontological or ideological parsimony advantages of nihilism. §4 defends and elaborates my views on ideological parsimony employed in the previous section, while §5 clarifies how my Plural Instantiation Strategy advances the debate and defends the strategy against an objection from the unity of consciousness.Suppose we have good reason to believe that wholes have novel properties over and above the properties of their parts. Next suppose -in a drive for ontological austerity, perhaps -that we get rid of the wholes from our Pacific Philosophical Quarterly •• (2015) ••-••