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A lump theorist claims that ordinary objects are spread out across possible worlds, much like many of us think that tables are spread out across space. We are not wholly located in any one particular world, the lump theorist claims, just as we are not wholly spatially located where one's hand is. We are modally spread out, a trans-world mereological sum of world-bound parts. We are lump sums of modal parts. And so are all other ordinary objects. In this paper, I explore lump theory and investigate five arguments against it. These arguments may be the primary reasons why lump theory (as envisioned here) has not been widely accepted--or extensively explored--until now. I maintain that these arguments can be answered, and moreover, that accepting lump theory has distinct advantages, making it a competitive view in its own right.1 Lump theory is just one way of embracing modal parts. Lewis (1986Lewis ( , 1993 accepts modal parts -and trans-world sums of modal parts-but he does not think that such objects are metaphysically interesting or relevant. (See below for an elaboration on how our views differ.) L. A. Paul (2002) andKris McDaniel (2004) argue for distinct views, each of which may be considered a 'modal parts' view, in virtue of the fact that individuals (on Paul's view) have modal properties as parts, or because individuals (on McDaniel's view) wholly exist in more than one possible world. Paul's and McDaniel's views differ from the one I am endorsing here, however, which is discussed in Brian Weatherson ms (n.d.) and(2003), andDavid Kaplan (1979).
A lump theorist claims that ordinary objects are spread out across possible worlds, much like many of us think that tables are spread out across space. We are not wholly located in any one particular world, the lump theorist claims, just as we are not wholly spatially located where one's hand is. We are modally spread out, a trans-world mereological sum of world-bound parts. We are lump sums of modal parts. And so are all other ordinary objects. In this paper, I explore lump theory and investigate five arguments against it. These arguments may be the primary reasons why lump theory (as envisioned here) has not been widely accepted--or extensively explored--until now. I maintain that these arguments can be answered, and moreover, that accepting lump theory has distinct advantages, making it a competitive view in its own right.1 Lump theory is just one way of embracing modal parts. Lewis (1986Lewis ( , 1993 accepts modal parts -and trans-world sums of modal parts-but he does not think that such objects are metaphysically interesting or relevant. (See below for an elaboration on how our views differ.) L. A. Paul (2002) andKris McDaniel (2004) argue for distinct views, each of which may be considered a 'modal parts' view, in virtue of the fact that individuals (on Paul's view) have modal properties as parts, or because individuals (on McDaniel's view) wholly exist in more than one possible world. Paul's and McDaniel's views differ from the one I am endorsing here, however, which is discussed in Brian Weatherson ms (n.d.) and(2003), andDavid Kaplan (1979).
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