A Static State Estimation Approach Including Bad Data Detection and Identification in Power Systems

Lin, Jujian; Pan, Heng-Yau

doi:10.1109/pes.2007.385500

Cited by 27 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…It was discovered that if the configuration of the power system is known by the attacker all standard techniques for bad measurement detection can be bypassed because these techniques depend on the assumption that "when bad measurements take place, the squares of differences between the observed measurements and their corresponding estimates often become significant" [98], [159]. The seminal paper on this topic by Liu et al indicates that this assumption is not true in case there is an attack.…”

Section: K System-theoretic Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Denial-of-Service Attacks and Solutions in the Smart Grid

et al. 2020

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The scope, scale, and intensity of real, as well as potential attacks, on the Smart Grid have been increasing and thus gaining more attention. An important component of Smart Grid cybersecurity efforts addresses the availability and access to the power and related information and communications infrastructures. We overload the term, Denial-of-Service (DoS), to refer to these attacks in the Smart Grid. In this paper, we provide a holistic and methodical presentation of the DoS attack taxonomies as well as a survey of potential solution techniques to help draw a more concerted and coordinated research into this area, lack of which may have profound consequences. To the best of our knowledge, the literature does not have such a comprehensive survey study of the DoS attacks and solutions for the Smart Grid. INDEX TERMS Denial-of-Service attacks, Smart grid security, Cybersecurity I. ACRONYMS In order to make the paper more clear and easier to read, we provide a table of acronyms in Table 1

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Section: K System-theoretic Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Denial-of-Service Attacks and Solutions in the Smart Grid

et al. 2020

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“…Similar to the bad data detection [20], any error exceeds the preset threshold would be treated as an abnormal one, because under the Chi-square distribution the conditional probability P(E(t) > threshold|M) would be so small that the event {E(t) > threshold|M} is considered to hardly happen.…”

Section: B Trustworthiness Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Cross-Layer Defense Mechanism Against GPS Spoofing Attacks on PMUs in Smart Grids

Zhang²,

Trinkle

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

118

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Recent investigations have revealed the susceptibility of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to the time synchronization attack by spoofing its global positioning system (GPS). This paper proposes a cross-layer detection mechanism to fight against simultaneous attacks toward multiple PMUs. In the physical layer, we propose a GPS carrier-to-noise ratio (C/No) based spoofing detection technique. We apply the patch-monopole hybrid antenna to two GPS receivers and compute the difference between the standard deviation of each receiver's C/No. The priori probability of spoofing is calculated from the distributions of the difference. A counter is embedded in the physical layer to identify the most suspicious PMU. In the upper layer, the spoofing attack is considered similarly to the bad data injection toward the power system. A trustworthiness evaluation, which is based on both the physical layer information and power grid measurements, is applied to identify the PMU being attacked. An experiment has been carried to validate the proposed algorithm.Index Terms-Cross-layer mechanism, global positioning system (GPS) spoofing, multiple attacks detection, phasor measurement units (PMU).

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“…The Imhotep-SMT approach uses the Satisfiability Modulo Theories to solve the state estimation problem, whereas the least square approach estimates the state of a system by minimizing the mean square error. Furthermore, in [20], a consistency check among sensor readings is introduced for SSE under the FDI attacks. The formal definition of such a consistency check is presented in section II.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mahalanobis distance-based robust approaches against false data injection attacks on dynamic power state estimation

Lin,

Xiong

2021

Preprint

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State estimation plays a crucial role in the daily operation of power systems. Although many researchers have studied false data injection (FDI) attacks in power state estimation, current state estimation approaches are still highly vulnerable to FDI attacks. Currently, most existing studies on FDI attacks focus on static state estimation (SSE), where power system states are not changed with time, and one of them includes the discovery of three efficient FDI attacks that can introduce arbitrary large errors into certain state variables without being detected by existing bad measurement detection algorithms. In reality, however, power states are varied with time in real-world power systems. In this paper, we investigate the problem of the above three FDI attacks against dynamic power state estimation (DSE), where power system states are dynamically changed with time. Although the three attacks were discovered in SSE several years ago, none of them has been well addressed in static power state systems. In this research, we propose two robust defense approaches against the above three efficient FDI attacks on DSE. Compared to existing approaches, our proposed approaches have three major differences and significant strengths: (1) they defend against the three FDI attacks on dynamic power state estimation rather than static power state estimation, (2) they give a robust estimator that can accurately extract a subset of attack-free sensors for power state estimation, and (3) they adopt the little-known Mahalanobis distance in the consistency check of power sensor measurements, which is different from the Euclidean distance used in all the existing studies on power state estimation. We mathematically prove that the Mahalanobis distance is not only useful but also much better than the Euclidean distance in the consistency check of power sensor measurements. Our time complexity analysis shows that the proposed two robust defense approaches are efficient. Moreover, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approaches, we compare them with the three wellknown approaches: the least square approach, the Imhotep-SMT approach, and the MEE-UKF approach. Experiments show that the proposed approaches further reduce the estimation error by two orders of magnitude and four orders of magnitude compared to the Imhotep-SMT approach and the least square approach, respectively. Whereas our approach has a similar root mean square error as the Imhotep-SMT approach has, our approach provides a more stable result.

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A Static State Estimation Approach Including Bad Data Detection and Identification in Power Systems

Cited by 27 publications

References 9 publications

A Survey of Denial-of-Service Attacks and Solutions in the Smart Grid

A Survey of Denial-of-Service Attacks and Solutions in the Smart Grid

A Cross-Layer Defense Mechanism Against GPS Spoofing Attacks on PMUs in Smart Grids

Mahalanobis distance-based robust approaches against false data injection attacks on dynamic power state estimation

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