A puzzle about epistemic akrasia

Greco, Daniel

doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0085-3

Cited by 77 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…We can express this thought as follows: 14 13 There's a large literature on this topic; for a classic account of the irrationality of akrasia, see Davidson (1970). For some recent defenses of the irrationality of akrasia in the epistemic case, see Horowitz (2014) and Greco (2014). For a broad discussion of these issues in prudential and moral cases, and further references, see Stroud (2014).…”

Section: General Deferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Deference and Uniqueness

Meacham

2018

Philos Stud

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Section: General Deferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Deference and Uniqueness

Meacham

2018

Philos Stud

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“…Certain normative facts, on this view, are lustrous. 4 1 For defenses of principles in the neighborhood of DOWN, see Gibbons (2013), Greco (2014), Kiesewetter (forthcoming), Littlejohn (2012), Titelbaum (2015), and Way and Whiting (forthcoming). Some writers see these principles as trivial consequences of the factivity of justification (e.g., Littlejohn 2012), but some see them as revealing something surprising about the normative domain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

Dutant

Littlejohn

2016

Synthese

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While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridgeprinciples, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that's notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridgeprinciples will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won't lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.

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“…This means that the argument goes through even if the range of permissible credences has no lowest or highest value. 9 The Permissivist might object that I oversell the force of the dominance argument. If the range of permissible credences in Guilty is narrow, so narrow that Matt is not certain that any particular credence is rational, then his .3 credence in Guilty will not be rationality dominated.…”

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confidence: 99%

Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

Schultheis

2017

Mind

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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia

Cited by 77 publications

References 34 publications

Deference and Uniqueness

Deference and Uniqueness

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

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