Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

Unacknowledged Permissivism

“…On the other hand, Cohen (2013) argues for a version of UP. 7 See, for example, Dogramaci and Horowitz (2016), Horowitz (2013), Schultheis (2018), and White (2005White ( , 2013. 8 If you think that rationality admits of degrees, you can define an unacknowledged permissive case as one in which two people rationally hold different doxastic attitudes towards P on the basis of a single body of evidence E, but neither party believes that the attitude of the other party is equally rational to her own.…”

Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance

“…Quotidian Context: A set satisfies Quotidian Context relative to a property and a notion of closeness 12 just in case it is such that (1) there is some element 8 Schultheis slightly misstates her position. She writes, ''To believe that the lower bound is roughly .3 is just to believe that it might be slightly higher or slightly lower than .3'' (Schultheis 2018). But an agent who has no idea where the lower bound is believes that it might be slightly higher or slightly lower than .3, yet does not believe that the lower bound is roughly .3.…”

“…2 An overview Schultheis (2018) argues against epistemic permissivism, the thesis that a total evidential state can rationally permit more than one credence in a proposition. 1 We present her argument in terms of knowledge.…”

“…The close to relation is reflexive, thus any credence is close to itself. So if some credence is known to be rational, by Marginfor-Error it must be rational.22 Schultheis (2018).23 Schultheis (2018).Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance…”

Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust

“…See, for example, White (), Matheson (), Dogramaci and Horowitz (), Schultheis (), and Greco and Heddon (2016). …”