Deference and Uniqueness

Meacham, Christopher J. G.

doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1036-4

Cited by 10 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Similarly, the challenge for permissivism raised by Levinstein (2017) and Greco and Hedden (2016) also concerns rationality-attribution: They argue that permissivists can't explain the value of rationality attribution in planning and deference. For permissivists' responses to the value problem of rationality-attribution, see Thorstad (2019) and Meacham (2019).…”

Section: The Value Problem For Permissivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent defenders of impermissivism includeDogramaci and Horowitz (2016),Greco and Hedden (2016),Horowitz (2014Horowitz ( , 2019,Schultheis (2018), andWhite (2014). Recent defenders of permissivism includeKelly (2014),Meacham (2019), Palmira (forthcoming),Schoenfield (2014Schoenfield ( , 2019,Thorstad (2019), andYe (2019) Weisberg (2020). defends a mixed position: Evidential support is unique but rationality is permissive.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Section: The Value Problem For Permissivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…I set aside the possible positions of evidentialism without uniqueness (that evidence underdetermines rational belief but is the only relevant thing) or uniqueness without evidentialism (that rational factors include more than evidence but altogether uniquely determine belief). My target here is the combination of the two, what Chris Meacham (2019) calls the doctrine of Evidential Uniqueness. So the discussion opens onto vistas larger than just whether A&T have got it wrong.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

William James on Risk, Efficacy, and Evidentialism

Magnus

2020

Episteme

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William James’ argument against William Clifford in The Will to Believe is often understood in terms of doxastic efficacy, the power of belief to influence an outcome. Although that is one strand of James’ argument, there is another which is driven by ampliative risk. The second strand of James’ argument, when applied to scientific cases, is tantamount to what is now called the Argument from Inductive Risk. Either strand of James’ argument is sufficient to rebut Clifford's strong evidentialism and show that it is sometimes permissible to believe in the absence of compelling evidence. However, the two considerations have different scope and force. Doxastic efficacy applies in only some cases but allows any values to play a role in determining belief; risk applies in all cases but only allows particular conditional values to play a role.

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“… 21 Meacham (2019: note 22) has criticized (convincingly in my opinion) Greco and Hedden's argument that Permissivist's rationality is unsuitable for planning. However, as far as I can see, his criticism doesn't threaten the argument from Q 1 to Q 3 .…”

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confidence: 98%

The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism

2019

Episteme

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The debate between Uniqueness and Permissivism concerns whether a body of evidence sometimes allows multiple doxastic attitudes towards a proposition. An important motivation for Uniqueness is the so-called ‘arbitrariness argument,’ which says that Permissivism leads to some unacceptable arbitrariness with regard to one's beliefs. An influential response to the argument says that the arbitrariness in beliefs can be avoided by invoking epistemic standards. In this paper, I argue that such a response to the arbitrariness argument is unsuccessful. Then I defend a new response: contrary to common conception, the arbitrariness resulted by Permissivism is acceptable. The basic idea is that the arbitrariness resulted by Permissivism is analogous to the arbitrariness in permissive actions and the latter arbitrariness is intuitively acceptable. I answer three possible objections against this analogy, which are all motivated by the thought that beliefs aim at the truth. In addressing the last objection, I draw inspiration from the recent debate on transformative experience.

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Deference and Uniqueness

Cited by 10 publications

References 17 publications

Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology

Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology

William James on Risk, Efficacy, and Evidentialism

The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism

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