Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology

Ye, Ru

doi:10.1111/phpr.12845

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Rationality Versus Accuracy1

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2022

2023

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Article2

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Cited by 2 publications

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“…27 See, for example, Horowitz 2014, Wedgwood 2017, and Schoenfield 2019. For further discussion, see Ye (2023). Once again, this picture can be made more complicated if one adopts certain theories about the nature of rationality (or 'rationality').…”

Section: Rationality Versus Accuracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism

Satta

2023

Int. J. Study Skept.

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Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to reject external world skepticism. She offers an argument meant to convince a skeptic who accepts her views on “several orthogonal issues in epistemology” to give up their external world skepticism. While I agree with Rinard that it is possible to reason with a skeptic, I argue that Rinard overlooks a variety of good epistemic grounds a skeptic could appeal to in rejecting her argument and its conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the external world skeptic can resist Rinard’s conclusion by (1) distinguishing between skepticism about knowledge and skepticism about justification, (2) by prioritizing obtaining accurate beliefs (maximizing true beliefs and minimizing false beliefs) over being rational, or (3) by treating suspension of judgment as the default rational doxastic attitude.

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Section: Rationality Versus Accuracymentioning

confidence: 99%