In his book Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley offers an argument for the conclusion that it is quite unlikely that an ambiguity theory of 'knows' can be "linguistically grounded." His argument rests on two important assumptions: 1) that linguistic grounding of ambiguity requires evidence of the purported different senses of a word being represented by different words in other languages (i.e. represented by more than one word within other languages) and 2) that such evidence is lacking in the case of 'knows'. In this paper, I challenge the conclusion that there isn't a linguistic grounding for an ambiguity theory of 'knows' by making cases against both of Stanley's major assumptions. I will do this by making a case for a prime facie linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of 'knows' without appealing to word use in other languages. Given that a polysemy theory of 'knows' is a type of ambiguity theory of 'knows' (as will be explained shortly), if I succeed in linguistically grounding a polysemy theory of 'knows', then I have shown that at least one type of ambiguity theory of 'knows' can be linguistically grounded.In his book Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley offers an argument for the conclusion that it is quite unlikely that an ambiguity theory of 'knows' can be "linguistically grounded." 1 His argument rests on two important assumptions: 1) that linguistic grounding of ambiguity requires evidence of the purported different senses of a word being represented by different words in other languages (i.e. represented by more than one word within other languages) and 2) that such evidence is lacking in the case of 'knows'. In this paper, I challenge the conclusion that there isn't a linguistic grounding for an ambiguity theory of 'knows' by making cases against both of Stanley's major assumptions. I do this by making a case for a prima facie linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of 'knows' without appealing to word use in other languages. Given that a polysemy theory of 'knows' is a type of ambiguity theory of 1 Stanley (2005), 81.
The ambiguity theory of 'knows' is the view that 'knows' and its cognates have more than one propositional sense -i.e. more than one sense that can properly be used in 'knows that' etc. constructions. Given that most of us are 'intuitive invariantists' -i.e. most of us initially have the intuition that 'knows' is univocal -defenders of the ambiguity theory need to offer an explanation for the semantic blindness present if 'knows' is in fact ambiguous. This paper is an attempt to offer such an explanation. Section 1 contains a general argument for the ubiquity of semantic blindness for ambiguity; the upshot being that semantic blindness for the ambiguity of 'knows' is unsurprising as a result. Section 2 offers more specific arguments for why 'knows' is the type of ambiguous word we're very unlikely to quickly recognize is ambiguous.The ambiguity theory of 'knows' (hereafter 'the ambiguity theory'), is the view that 'knows' and its cognates 1 have more than one propositional sense-i.e. more than one sense that can properly be used in 'knows that' etc. constructions, such that which sense of 'knows' is used in a knowledge ascription determines, in part, the semantic content (and, thus, the truthconditions) of that knowledge ascription.The ambiguity theory has received relatively little attention in recent years, especially compared to prominent views about the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions, like epistemic contextualism. However, a handful of philosophers have defended positions that fall within the ambiguity theory family of views. 2 Elsewhere I've discussed some of the merits of the ambiguity theory. 3 In this paper I seek to go on the defensive and address a prime facie weakness of the 1 From here on out 'and its cognates' will typically be omitted, but should be understood as implied where appropriate.2 See e.g. Norman Malcolm (1952), Fred Feldman (1986), Matthias Steup (2005, and Baron Reed (2013). 3 In Satta (2017a), I offer linguistic arguments for an ambiguity theory of 'knows' using standard tests for ambiguity such as those found in Cruse (1982) andSennet (2011). In Satta (2017b), I argue that the ambiguity theory has advantages over epistemic contextualism and make clear how the ambiguity theory differs from epistemic contextualism.
The ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is the view that ‘knows’ and its cognates have more than one sense, and that which sense of ‘knows’ is used in a knowledge ascription or denial determines, in part, the meaning (and as a result the truth conditions) of that knowledge ascription or denial. In this paper, I argue that the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ ought to be taken seriously by those drawn to epistemic contextualism. In doing so I first argue that the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is a distinct view from epistemic contextualism. Second, I provide independent philosophical and linguistic considerations to motivate the ambiguity theory. Third, I argue that the ambiguity theory has the same central, generally agreed upon virtues ascribed to epistemic contextualism (namely, the ability to solve certain persistent epistemological problems relating to skeptical arguments and the ability to preserve the truth of most of our everyday, ordinary usages of ‘knows’ and its cognates). Finally, I provide an ambiguity-theory-friendly account of why contextualism may be initially appealing, and why this shouldn't dissuade us from taking the ambiguity theory seriously nonetheless.
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