A Problem for Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

Abstract

Duncan Pritchard has, in the years following his (2005) defence of a safety-based account of knowledge in Epistemic Luck, abjured his (2005) view that knowledge can be analysed exclusively in terms of a modal safety condition. He has since (2007; 2009; 2010) opted for an account according to which two distinct conditions function with equal importance and weight within an analysis of knowledge: an anti-luck condition (safety) and an ability condition-the latter being a condition aimed at preserving what Pritchard now takes to be a fundamental insight about knowledge: that it arises from cognitive ability (Greco (2010); Sosa (2007;2009). Pritchard calls his new view anti-luck virtue epistemology (ALVE). A key premise in Pritchard's argument for ALVE is what I call the independence thesis; the thesis that satisfying neither the anti-luck condition nor the ability condition entails that the other is satisfied. Pritchard's argument for the independence thesis relies crucially upon the case he makes for thinking that cognitive achievements are compatible with knowledge-undermining environmental luck-that is, the sort of luck widely thought to undermine knowledge in standard barn facade cases. In the first part of this paper, I outline the key steps in Pritchard's argument for anti-luck virtue epistemology and highlight how it is that the compatibility of cognitive achievement and knowledgeundermining environmental luck is indispensible to the argument's success. The second part of this paper aims to show that this compatibility premise crucial to Pritchard's argument is incorrect. Part I Motivating Anti-Luck Virtue EpistemologyTwo insights key to Pritchard's (2007;2008;2009;2010; new theory of knowledge-anti-luck virtue epistemology (ALVE)-are that (put simply) (i) knowlege excludes luck; and (ii) knowledge arises from ability. These insights are crucial to motivating his ALVE account-which will be the critical focus of this paper-and so I think it will be useful to begin by making precise what each

Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck

“…Pritchard (forthcoming), Sosa (), and Turri () all agree that cognitive achievement is incompatible with intervening luck but compatible with environmental luck. My position – in agreement with Carter () and Greco () – is that full cognitive achievement is incompatible with both. Indeed, I claim, pace Pritchard (forthcoming), that a robust virtue theory of knowledge just is an anti‐luck theory of knowledge that needs no further supplementation.…”

“…Veritic luck contrasts with situational luck. For this distinction and more on the distinction between intervening and environmental veritic luck, see Carter () and Pritchard ().…”

How and Why Knowledge is First

“…She left the others because she thought that she heard someone 21 I used to think he was right, but I now think that it's not for reasons discussed in Littlejohn (2014). Like Carter (2013) and Jarvis (2013), I'm skeptical of the idea that the environmental luck cases are cases in which the correctness of your predication is attributable to the exercise of your abilities.…”

Luck: Its Nature and Significance for Human Knowledge and Agency

“…(cf. Carter 2013, Kelp 2013 Obviously, if B's accuracy doesn't manifest any of S's cognitive abilities, then it doesn't manifest any of S's environmentally reliable cognitive abilities. But the converse is false: even if B's accuracy doesn't manifest any of S's environmentally reliable cognitive abilities, it might still manifest some of S's environmentally un reliable cognitive abilities.…”