A pricing/ordering model for a dyadic supply chain with buyback guarantee financing and fairness concerns

Chen, Jianxin; Zhou, Yong‐Wu; Zhong, Yuanguang

doi:10.1080/00207543.2017.1308571

Cited by 103 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Thus, we assume that product price p is an exogenous variable and normalized to 1. The same assumption can be widely found in the literature related to supply chain finance (e.g., Jing and Seidmann, ; Chen et al., ; Gao et al., ; Kouvelis and Zhao, ). Unlike product price, which has a negative effect on product demands, the manufacturer's carbon reduction level positively affects product demands (Cao et al., ).…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 61%

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Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints

Cao

et al. 2018

Int Trans Operational Res

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Carbon tax policy is widely adopted by many countries to curb carbon emissions. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms have more incentive to improve carbon reduction levels by reducing their carbon tax costs. However, firms need to bear carbon reduction costs that may cause shortage of capital. Thus, firms may face problems of financial constraints, which may demotivate firms to produce greener products. To address the decision-making challenges of firms in the contexts of carbon tax policy and financial constraints, we consider a supply chain with a manufacturer who produces green products and a retailer who sells these products. Our study develops five models to investigate the two firms' optimal wholesale price, carbon reduction level and ordering quantity, according to the manufacturer and retailer with or without financial constraints. Our goal in this study is to explore how carbon tax policy and banks' interest rates affect the profits of the two firms, supply chain and consumer surplus. Certain managerial insights are obtained as follows. We demonstrate that carbon tax policy and banks' interest rates demotivate the manufacturer to produce greener products and demotivate the retailer to order more products. If the interest rate to the manufacturer (retailer) is relatively low, then the manufacturer with financial constraint benefits (harms) the consumers compared with the retailer with financial constraint. Importantly, our analysis suggests that carbon tax policy harms the firms but benefits consumers, and the government in some conditions should reduce unit carbon tax.

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Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 61%

“…Chen et al. () consider buyback guarantee financing and fairness concerns and investigate the optimal ordering strategy in three scenarios (i.e., no budget constraint, financing service, and bank financing). The results show that fairness concerns and initial budget have significant effects on channel members’ optimal decisions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints

Cao

et al. 2018

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…Caliskan-Demirag et al [9] further studied how policy makers of fairness preference coordinate the supply chain. Chen et al [10] studied the impact of fairness concerns on members' equilibrium strategies in a supply chain including one supplier and one retailer, and the result showed that the retailer's fairness concerns are beneficial for the supply chain to improve the performance when the retailer takes the risk of uncertain market solely.…”

Section: Fairness Concerns Of Supply Chain Membersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision making and coordination of fresh agriculture product supply chain considering fairness concerns

Yan

Chen

2020

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This paper investigates decisions in a supply chain of fresh agricultural products considering fairness concerns. By considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer, this paper discusses the effect of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns and the retailer’s fairness concerns on the fresh agriculture product supply chain within the framework of Nash bargaining. Meanwhile, a revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain with fairness concerns. The results show that the manufacturer’s behavioral tendency of fairness concerns will reduce their fresh-keeping effort; thereby, the freshness of products and market demand will also decrease. The behavioral tendencies of fairness concerns of both sides reduce the overall effectiveness of the supply chain and adversely affect the stability of the fresh produce supply chain. Both the optimal retail price and the fresh-keeping effort can be achieved while all parties get higher utilities under the revenue-sharing contract in comparison to the case without coordination.

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“…(4) Different from the research [34], we consider that government will offer the manufacturer certain subsidy to promote the manufacturer to produce green products, and meanwhile we assume that per unit product subsidy is directly proportional to the product green degree based on the previous literature [21,42], therefore, the government subsidy for the unit product is , in which 휃 > 0 represents Unit product subsidy coefficient. (5) Different from these researches [31,34,39] considering distribution fairness concern, we describe fairness preference by taking Nash bargaining solutions as fairness reference points according to previous literature [26,43].…”

Section: Supply Chain Optimal Decision With Fairness Preferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer

Zhang

Zhou

2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.

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A pricing/ordering model for a dyadic supply chain with buyback guarantee financing and fairness concerns

Cited by 103 publications

References 33 publications

Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints

Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints

Decision making and coordination of fresh agriculture product supply chain considering fairness concerns

Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer

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