A Non-Cooperative Game Analysis of Competition between Content Providers in the Internet Market

Mobile Information Systems

et al. 2021

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With a sponsored content plan on the Internet market, a content provider (CP) negotiates with the Internet service providers (ISPs) on behalf of the end-users to remove the network subscription fees. In this work, we have studied the impact of data sponsoring plans on the decision-making strategies of the ISPs and the CPs in the telecommunications market. We develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers (CPs and ISPs), where the CPs sponsor content. We formulate the interactions between the ISPs and between the CPs as a noncooperative game. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning the Nash equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of the sponsoring content on providers’ policies.

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“…where λ and μ are nonnegative constants. e QoS is defined as the expected delay (see [17,34]). e QoC can be specified for a specific domain of content (e.g., video streaming).…”

Section: Utility Model Of the Cpmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Game theory has been used to solve many problems in communication networks [15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. It has been used to propose new pricing strategies for Internet services [24,25].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing the Dynamic Data Sponsoring in the Case of Competing Internet Service Providers and Content Providers

Mobile Information Systems

et al. 2021

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“…θ i c 2 i is the cost to produce the credibility of content c i . e credibility of content c i of CP i is a function of the quality of service q ss i and quality content q c i , which can be expressed as [33,[35][36][37]…”

Section: Utility Model Of the Cpmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Caching on CP and ISP Policies in Information-Centric Networks

Mobile Information Systems

et al. 2020

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Internet traffic volume is increasing, and this causes scalability issues in content delivery. Information-centric network has been introduced to support this increase in Internet traffic through caching. While collaborative caching in information-centric network is a crucial feature to improve network performance and reduce delivery costs in content distribution, the current pricing strategies on the Internet are not incentive compatible with information-centric network interconnection. In this paper, we focus on the economic incentive interactions in caching deployment between several types of information-centric network providers (content provider and Internet service provider). In particular, we develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers in an information-centric network model where the providers are motivated to cache and share content. We use a generalized Zipf distribution to model content popularity. We formulate the interactions between the Internet service providers and between the content providers as a noncooperative game. We use a Stackelberg game model to capture the interactions between the content provider and Internet service providers. Through mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. An iterative and distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the equilibrium point. The numerical simulations illustrate that our proposed game models result in a win-win solution.

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“…The authors formulate interactions among CPs and and among CDN as a non-cooperative game. In [17], the authors study competition between the CPs as a non-cooperative game. The authors in [18] studied competition between ISP in Information Centric Network using mathematical tools game theory.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Sponsoring Content in the Internet Market

et al. 2020

JCOMSS

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