A live experiment on approval voting

Laslier, Jean‐François; Straeten, Karine Van der

doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9149-6

Cited by 69 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…First, as originally argued by Brams and Fishburn (1978) and already observed by Laslier and Van der Straeten (2008), voters in our experiments had no difficulty understanding the method, as reflected e.g. in the low number of invalid ballots in Table 1.…”

Section: Qualitative Lessons From the Datasupporting

confidence: 67%

“…Their participants on average approved of 3.15 out of 16 candidates (where a total of 2,587 ballots were cast). Actually, the means of approvals for the List Vote are of comparable magnitude to the one in the 2007 French presidential election experiment by Baujard andIgersheim (2009, 2010) [Laslier and Van der Straeten (2008) collected data in the 2002 election]. In this experiment, 2,813 participants on average approved of 2.23 out 12 feasible candidates.…”

Section: Participation Statistics and Voting Behaviormentioning

confidence: 63%

“…The particularities of the German electoral systems allowed us to collect data on four elections with the help of two field experiments. Further, in sharp contrast to the French presidential election experiments in 2002 (Laslier and Van der Straeten 2008) and 2007(Baujard and Igersheim 2009, 2010, we could adopt and test a variant of Approval Voting within a party-based, proportional representation framework. To the best of our knowledge, this possibility has received no or very little attention in the literature up to this point (Brams and Kilgour 2010 is a notable exception).…”

Section: Design Of the Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

Alós–Ferrer

Granić

2011

Soc Choice Welf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We report on two field experiments on Approval Voting conducted during actual state and federal elections in Germany. Voters provided approval ballots both for named district candidates and for state parties. The data reveal significant discrepancies in the outcomes under the official method and Approval Voting. Further, our analysis suggests that currently used voting methods do a poor job of representing the electorate's preferences. As a consequence, some recurring features of the political landscape in a given country might be, in part, an artifice of the employed voting method.

show abstract

Section: Qualitative Lessons From the Datasupporting

confidence: 67%

Section: Participation Statistics and Voting Behaviormentioning

confidence: 63%

Section: Design Of the Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

Alós–Ferrer

Granić

2011

Soc Choice Welf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Alternatively, the voting process is much like a support vote as outlined in Laslier and Van der Straeten (2008), where the location receiving the most support is improved or chosen as the location for the public good.…”

Section: Location Of Public Goodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiency of public goods provision in space

Warziniack¹

2010

Ecological Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis article incorporates a political decision process into an urban land use model to predict the likely location of a public good. It fills an important gap in the literature by modeling the endogenous location of open space. The article compares open space decisions made under a majority-rules voting scheme with welfare-improving criterion and finds households tied to a location in space compete against each other for public goods located nearer them. Significant differences emerge between the two decision criteria, indicating that requiring referenda for open space decisions is likely to lead to inefficient outcomes. Specifically, many open space votes are likely to fail that would lead to welfare improvements, and any open space decisions that do pass will require amenities larger than needed to achieve the social optimum. The more dispersed and large the population, the larger is the gap between the socially efficient level and the level needed for a public referendum to pass.

show abstract

“…Probably the most relevant field experiments on political elections related to our investigation are those by Laslier and Sanver (2010), Baujard et al (2014), Laslier and Van der Straeten (2008) 1 on French elections, Roescu (2014) on a Romanian election, Wantchekon (2003) on an election in Benin, and Alòs-Ferrer and Granić (2012) on German elections. In addition, the interesting studies by Popov et al (2014) and Regenwetter et al (2007) analyze 15 American Psychological Association (APA) presidential elections each with more than 13,000 cast ballots 2 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally, we provide a categorization of different types of parties and analyze the impact of certain voting rules (Plurality Rule, Plurality Run Off, Hare System, Condorcet Method, Approval Voting, Borda Rule, Evaluative Voting, and Majority Judgment) on the performances of parties in those scenarios.

show abstract

A live experiment on approval voting

Cited by 69 publications

References 20 publications

Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

Efficiency of public goods provision in space

Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About