Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

Alós–Ferrer, Carlos; Granić, Ɖura-Georg

doi:10.1007/s00355-011-0550-5

Cited by 35 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…At this point it is important to study the consequences of strengthening Symmetry across types to the classical Anonymity property (that is, to strengthen weak symmetry to symmetry). 3 Since Approval Voting is the unique Type-weighted Approval Voting procedure that is also symmetric, we obviously obtain a characterization of Approval Voting. However, one important insight is that one can then, at the same time, eliminate the continuity axiom, a fact that has been shown independently and simultaneously to this paper by Sato (2013) using a different proof technique.…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

Alcalde–Unzu

Vorsatz

2014

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.

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Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

Alcalde–Unzu

Vorsatz

2014

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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“…Among experimental as opposed to observational studies, a rich literature on alternative ballot types in Europe and Canada (e.g., Alos-Ferrer & Granic, 2012;Baujard, Igersheim, Lebon, Favrel, & Laslier, 2014;Blais, Heroux-Legault, Stephenson, Cross, & Gidengil, 2012;Farvaque, Jayet, & Ragot, 2011;Van der Straeten, Laslier, Sauger, & Blais, 2010) lays the foundation for offering different treatments on input rules in voting experiments. But these studies have not directly confronted the theoretic dilemma of expression and accessibility, and the related concept of voting error has barely featured there.…”

Section: Voting Error: Previous Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Input Rules and Ballot Options on Voting Error: An Experimental Analysis

Maloy¹,

Ward²

2021

PaG

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When election reforms such as Ranked Choice Voting or the Alternative Vote are proposed to replace plurality voting, they offer lengthier instructions, more opportunities for political expression, and more opportunities for mistakes on the ballot. Observational studies of voting error rely on ecological inference from geographically aggregated data. Here we use an experimental approach instead, to examine the effect of two different ballot conditions at the individual level of analysis: the input rules that the voter must use and the number of ballot options presented for the voter’s choice. This experiment randomly assigned three different input rules (single-mark, ranking, and grading) and two different candidate lists (with six and eight candidates) to over 6,000 online respondents in the USA, during the American presidential primary elections in 2020, simulating a single-winner presidential election. With more expressive input rules (ranking and grading), the distinction between minor mistakes and totally invalid votes—a distinction inapplicable to single‐mark ballots (1MB) voting—assumes new importance. Regression analysis indicates that more complicated input rules and more candidates on the ballot did not raise the probability that a voter would cast a void (uncountable) vote, despite raising the probability of at least one violation of voting instructions.

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“…Such ballots have e.g. been used in France [36] and Germany [37]. The candidates/parties can be expected to be quite well distinguishable by their political views, hence some pairs of them are more likely to be marked together by the voters than others.…”

Section: Ballot Sheet Designs and Attack Ideamentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Your Vote Overheard? A New Scalable Side-Channel Attack Against Paper Voting

Krips

Willemson

Varv

2019

2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)

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In an ongoing discussion comparing the security properties of electronic and paper voting, decreased privacy is often presented as an argument against remote Internet voting. We contribute to this discussion by presenting a side-channel attack against the physical environment of traditional paperbased elections. More precisely, we build a device based on an Arduino development board and cheap electret microphones, capable of triangulating the locations of marks made on wooden tables with high precision. In the best configuration, we are able to determine the correct cell having dimensions 4 × 5 cm with more than 90% accuracy. This will allow breaching privacy of ballot sheet designs that rely on the voter marking her choice(s) between a potentially high number of candidates printed on one large sheet. We complement our attack with a study on various aspects of deployment of facial recognition. This gives rise to the setup where the attacker installs cameras in the polling stations, aiming at automated detection of people leaving the voting booths. Combining the two approaches, we will have a completely automated (and hence relatively well scalable) attack against the privacy of paper-based voting.

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Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany

Cited by 35 publications

References 19 publications

Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

The Impact of Input Rules and Ballot Options on Voting Error: An Experimental Analysis

Is Your Vote Overheard? A New Scalable Side-Channel Attack Against Paper Voting

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