A Hardware-Based Countermeasure to Reduce Side-Channel Leakage: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation

Gornik, Andreas; Moradi, Amir; Oehm, J.; Paar, Christof

doi:10.1109/tcad.2015.2423274

Cited by 31 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Since gaining attention in 2003, when Brumley and Boneh (2003) carried out a successful remote timing attack on real applications over a local network (Brumley and Boneh, 2003), research efforts have been made on the security analysis of PC platforms from a side-channel perspective (Gornik et al, 2015;Kong et al, 2008;Aciiçmez, 2007). The research community's realisation that the performance of some microprocessors could create critical side-channel emissions has led to the birth of the Microarchitectural Analysis research field, which is now an emerging area of side-channel cryptanalysis.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware

Montasari

Hill

Hosseinian-Far

et al. 2019

IJESDF

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There are several vulnerabilities in computing systems hardware that can be exploited by attackers to carry out devastating Microarchitectural Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks against these systems and as a result compromise the security of the users of such systems. By exploiting Microarchitectural resources, adversaries can potentially launch different variants of Timing Attacks, for instance, to leak sensitive information through timing. In view of these security threats against computing hardware, in a recent study, titled "Are Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks Feasible in Shared, Modern Computing Hardware?", currently undergoing the review process, we presented and analysed several such attacks. This extended study proceeds to build upon our recent study in question. To this end, we analyse the existing countermeasures against Timing Attacks and propose new strategies in dealing with such attacks.

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Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware

Montasari

Hill

Hosseinian-Far

et al. 2019

IJESDF

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“…This research felt that further evaluation was required, thus the Chi-square test [56] was applied. This approach is utilised to evaluate hardware countermeasures, especially with regard to hardware noise generators [57]. The purpose of this test is to evaluate how likely the EM emissions generated as the AES-128 algorithm executed can be detected within the noise.…”

Section: Attacking the Improved Countermeasurementioning

confidence: 99%

Developing an Electromagnetic Noise Generator to Protect a Raspberry PI from Side Channel Analysis

Frieslaar

Irwin

2018

SAIEE Afr. Res. J.

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This research investigates the Electromagnetic (EM) side channel leakage of a Raspberry Pi 2 B+. An evaluation is performed on the EM leakage as the device executes the AES-128 cryptographic algorithm contained in the libcrypto++ library in a threaded environment. Four multi-threaded implementations are evaluated. These implementations are Portable Operating System Interface Threads, C++11 threads, Threading Building Blocks, and OpenMP threads. It is demonstrated that the various thread techniques have distinct variations in frequency and shape as EM emanations are leaked from the Raspberry Pi. It is demonstrated that the AES-128 cryptographic implementation within the libcrypto++ library on a Raspberry Pi is vulnerable to Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. The cryptographic process was seen visibly within the EM spectrum and the data for this process was extracted where digital filtering techniques was applied to the signal. The resultant data was utilised in the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) attack and the results revealed 16 sub-keys that are required to recover the full AES-128 secret key. Based on this discovery, this research introduced a multi-threading approach with the utilisation of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) to serve as a software based countermeasure to mitigate SCA attacks. The proposed countermeasure known as the FRIES noise generator executed as a Daemon and generated EM noise that was able to hide the cryptographic implementations and prevent the DEMA attack and other statistical analysis.

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“…It is also a useful tool to discuss independence issues in masking proofs [6]. Second, from a practical point-of-view, it has been used in various concrete security evaluations of threshold implementations, but also other hardware countermeasures [21,13,27,32]. …”

Section: Follow Up Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moments-Correlating DPA

Moradi

Standaert

2016

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Theory of Implementation Security

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We generalize correlation-enhanced power analysis collision attacks into moments-correlating DPA. The resulting distinguisher is applicable to the profiled and non-profiled (collision) settings and is able to exploit information lying in any statistical moment. It also benefits from a simple ruleof-thumb to estimate its data complexity. Experimental results show that such a tool allows answering with confidence to some important questions regarding the design of sidechannel countermeasures (e.g. what is the most informative statistical moment in the leakages of a threshold implementation). We further argue that moments-correlating DPA is a natural candidate for leakage detection tests, enjoying the simplicity of correlation power analysis and advanced features for the evaluation of higher-order attacks with an easy-to-compute confidence level.

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A Hardware-Based Countermeasure to Reduce Side-Channel Leakage: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation

Cited by 31 publications

References 28 publications

Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware

Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware

Developing an Electromagnetic Noise Generator to Protect a Raspberry PI from Side Channel Analysis

Moments-Correlating DPA

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