A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model

Cho, Seokju; Duggan, John

doi:10.1007/s00182-014-0460-8

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 19 publications

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“…Under sequential voting and some mild assumptions on the order of voting, they find that only the median ideal alternative can be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Cho and Duggan (2013) demonstrate that this result does not carry over to simultaneous and publicly observed voting, even when voting is assumed to be stage-undominated and even obtain the support of arbitrary outcomes for arbitrary positive discount factors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

Herings¹,

Meshalkin

Predtetchinski³

2018

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the threeperson case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a proposal which is accepted without delay. Laboratory experiments show various deviations from this equilibrium, where different offers are typically made and delay may occur before acceptance. We address the issue to what extent these findings are compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium and characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any value of the discount factor. We show that for any proposal in the interior of the space of possible agreements there exists a discount factor such that the proposal is made and accepted. We characterize the values of the discount factor for which equilibria with one-period delay exist. We show that any amount of equilibrium delay is possible and we construct subgame perfect equilibria such that arbitrary long delay occurs with probability one.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

Herings¹,

Meshalkin

Predtetchinski³

2018

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Eraslan

Evdokimov

2019

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

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