Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Meshalkin, Andrey; Predtetchinski, Arkadi

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2378718

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…14 There is a strand of the literature that studies equilibria with history-dependent strategies. See Cho & Duggan (2009), Cho & Duggan (2015), Herings et al (2017), Herings et al (2018).…”

Section: Baron-ferejohn Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Eraslan

Evdokimov

2019

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

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“…14 There is a strand of the literature that studies equilibria with history-dependent strategies. See Cho & Duggan (2009), Cho & Duggan (2015), Herings et al (2017), Herings et al (2018).…”

Section: Baron-ferejohn Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Eraslan

Evdokimov

2019

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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“…The main contribution of Herings et al (2018) is to identify a punishment strategy for deviators such that it does not pay to vote against the equilibrium proposal or propose differently. Which proposal is selected in equilibrium is exogenous to the model.…”

Section: Subgame Perfect Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1. When there is no discounting, any allocation of the fund is an SPE of the bargaining game (Herings et al, 2018).…”

Section: Subgame Perfect Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Communication in Multilateral Bargaining with Joint Production

Barański

Cox

2019

SSRN Journal

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We experimentally investigate the effect on efficiency of pre-bargaining communication in a multilateral majoritarian bargaining game with joint production under two conditions: observable and unobservable productive investments. In both conditions, communication mainly fosters fair sharing and is rarely used by proposers to pit voters against each other. A virtuous cycle of proportional surplus sharing arises in treatments with observable investments regardless of whether communication is possible leading to high efficiency gains over time. In the absence of investment observability, communication is widely used by subjects to truthfully report their investments, which coupled with calls for equitable sharing, allows for substantial efficiency gains. These results contrast sharply with previous findings on bargaining over an exogenous fund where communication leads to highly unequal outcomes, competitive messages, and virtually no calls for fair sharing.

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Legislative Bargaining with Teams

Bradfield

Kagel

2014

SSRN Journal

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Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining

Cited by 3 publications

References 20 publications

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Communication in Multilateral Bargaining with Joint Production

Legislative Bargaining with Teams

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