A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism

Jackson, Elizabeth

doi:10.1017/epi.2019.19

Cited by 40 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 76 publications

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“…There are putative objections against Immodesty that have nothing to do with social mechanisms. For instance, some philosophers have argued that we should make a distinction between the epistemically required and the epistemically supererogatory (Jackson forthcoming, 5–7; Li, 2017). Suppose agents ought to entertain sufficiently reliable standards, but not maximally reliable standards.…”

Section: Should Agents Be Immodest? Social Contexts and Opaque Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should agents be immodest?

Daoust

2020

Philosophical Books

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Epistemically immodest agents take their own epistemic standards to be among the most truth-conducive ones available to them. Many philosophers have argued that immodesty is epistemically required of agents, notably because being modest entails a problematic kind of incoherence or self-distrust. In this paper, I argue that modesty is epistemically permitted in some social contexts. I focus on social contexts where agents with limited cognitive capacities cooperate with each other (like juries).

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Section: Should Agents Be Immodest? Social Contexts and Opaque Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should agents be immodest?

Daoust

2020

Philosophical Books

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“…One might exercise semi-direct control via focusing on a particular seeming, which, when combined with evidence focusing and deliberation, can lead to forming the corresponding belief. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this distinction.18 SeeJackson (2021) for a further defense of this claim in non-theistic cases, and an explanation of how it supports intrapersonal permissivism.…”

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confidence: 98%

“…Roeber (2020) andJackson (2021) offer alternative responses to the toggling worry that apply when practical reasons are not at play.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager

Jackson

2021

Erkenn

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Epistemic permissivism is the thesis that the evidence can rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. Pascal's wager is the idea that one ought to believe in God for practical reasons, because of what one can gain if theism is true and what one has to lose if theism is false. In this paper, I argue that if epistemic permissivism is true, then the defender of Pascal's wager has powerful responses to two prominent objections. First, I argue that if permissivism is true, then permissivism is true about theistic belief. Second, I show how epistemic permissivism about theistic belief dispels two objections to Pascal's wager: the objection that wagering is impossible, and the objection that wagering is epistemically impermissible.

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“… 3 I follow most people in the literature in using ‘rational’ to mean ‘rationally permissible’ and in regarding rational permissibility as all-or-nothing. However, a reader might think that rationality can come in degrees because, say, there are rationally supererogatory beliefs (see Jackson Forthcoming). Such readers should understand the debate between Uniqueness and Permissivism as a debate about whether evidence can allow opposite beliefs to be ‘maximally’ or ‘fully’ rational (see Kelly 2014: 299 for such a formulation).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…See Rosen (2001), Kelly (2014), Meacham (2014), Podgorski (2016), Schoenfield (2014), Simpson (2017), Thorstad (Forthcoming), and Titelbaum and Kopec (Forthcoming). For a defense of Intra-personal Permissivism, see Jackson (Forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism

2019

Episteme

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The debate between Uniqueness and Permissivism concerns whether a body of evidence sometimes allows multiple doxastic attitudes towards a proposition. An important motivation for Uniqueness is the so-called ‘arbitrariness argument,’ which says that Permissivism leads to some unacceptable arbitrariness with regard to one's beliefs. An influential response to the argument says that the arbitrariness in beliefs can be avoided by invoking epistemic standards. In this paper, I argue that such a response to the arbitrariness argument is unsuccessful. Then I defend a new response: contrary to common conception, the arbitrariness resulted by Permissivism is acceptable. The basic idea is that the arbitrariness resulted by Permissivism is analogous to the arbitrariness in permissive actions and the latter arbitrariness is intuitively acceptable. I answer three possible objections against this analogy, which are all motivated by the thought that beliefs aim at the truth. In addressing the last objection, I draw inspiration from the recent debate on transformative experience.

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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism

Cited by 40 publications

References 76 publications

Should agents be immodest?

Should agents be immodest?

A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager

The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism

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