A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: consolidation without consensus

Eythórsson, Einar

doi:10.1016/s0308-597x(00)00021-x

Cited by 126 publications

(90 citation statements)

References 4 publications

(7 reference statements)

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“…Based on the catch history for the previous 3 years, each vessel was allocated a share of the annually set TAC. In this transitional phase, fishermen had the choice between the quota system and the former system based on restricting effort (Eythórsson 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving or overturning the ITQ system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries

Kokorsch

Karlsdóttir²,

Benediktsson

2015

Maritime Studies

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Icelandic fisheries have gone through tremendous changes since the 1980s and the gradual implementation of individual transferable quotas. The paper investigates to what extent the power of different stakeholders in the fisheries management system has changed, and examines whether and in which fields enhanced participation is favoured by relevant stakeholder groups. Strengths and weaknesses of participation within the system are scrutinized and alternatives assessed. The analytical framework stems from the concept of adaptive co-management, whereas the empirical data derives from a survey on Icelandic fisheries management among important stakeholder groups. This survey showed that the critique of individual transferable quotas is not homogeneous. Regional differences are present regarding the evaluation of the current regime, but also of proposed alternative management instruments. Overall, more stakeholder participation, especially in data gathering and decision making, is demanded. This has in fact decreased over time. The authors suggest that the perceived shortcomings of the quota system in general and the lack of stakeholder participation in particular, can be addressed by adopting certain elements of adaptive co-management.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving or overturning the ITQ system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries

Kokorsch

Karlsdóttir²,

Benediktsson

2015

Maritime Studies

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“…This is well documented in the literature (Dewees 1998;Squires et al 1998;Eythórsson 2000;Arnason 2002;Matulich and Clark 2003), and has been described as rent seeking (Bergland et al 2001). In this case, the evidence of rent seeking is mixed.…”

Section: Disagreement Over the Allocation Of Quotamentioning

confidence: 67%

“…Historically, fisheries that adopted ITQs or catch share regimes were often under severe economic and/or biological stress before adopting ITQs (Dewees 1998;Eythórsson 2000;Arnason 2002;Yandle 2008). That is not the case here, allowing the crabbers an opportunity to more thoroughly examine and think through the long-term implications of adopting such a program.…”

Section: Economic and Biological Condition Of The Golden Crab Fisherymentioning

confidence: 99%

Renegotiating property rights in the Florida golden crab fishery

2013

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Abstract:The golden crab (Chaceon fenneri) supports a small, economically healthy fishery in south Florida. Crabbers in the fishery have successfully protected themselves against larger outside fishing interests in the past, and management has been stable for over 15 years. Why, then, did a portion of the fleet propose shifting to individual transferable quotas (ITQs)? Our findings suggest that proponents sought ITQ management because they believed it would further limit the ability of other crabbers to enter the fishery and act as a mechanism to legally preserve the informal and formal property rights that they have previously negotiated among themselves. Opponents believed that a shift to an ITQ regime would destroy those same property rights. We explore the implications of these findings to a broader understanding of property rights and natural resource management institutions, noting that the currently existing system closely resembles a territorial use rights fishery (TURF).

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“…This recognition leverages questions about the evolution of commons scholarship, and about co-management, which has become a normative natural resource policy model, especially in less developed and indigenous contexts (Agrawal and Gibson 1999;Dongier et al 2002;Wilson et al 2003;Mansuri and Rao 2004;Feit and Spaeder 2005;Young 2006;Armitage et al 2008;Nelson and Agrawal 2008;Rasul et al 2011). It echoes prior work in other fisheries, demonstrating how management changes can inadvertently exacerbate conservation or equity concerns (Copes 1986;Munk-Madsen 1998;National Research Council 1999;Eythórsson 2000;Mansfield 2004;Degnbol et al 2006;Pinkerton and Edwards 2009;Gibbs 2010;Carothers 2011). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 74%

Revisiting Maine’s lobster commons: rescaling political subjects

Brewer

2012

Int J Commons

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Calls for cross-scalar theoretical and methodological approaches are not new to commons scholarship. Such efforts might be hastened by channelling poststructuralist and critical theory perspectives through the geographic subfield of political ecology, including attention to political scales and subjects. Toward this end, this paper reconsiders Maine's lobster fishery. This case has provided rich material for watershed commons scholarship, demonstrating the ability of social groups to conserve resources independent of government or markets, and it continues to offer new findings. Recent fieldwork shows that as lobster boat captains advance collective interests through state-supported co-management governance arrangements, concerns of crew and non-fishing community members may be marginalized. Regulatory exclusion prevents broader distribution of resource benefits at a time when employment alternatives are scarce. More pluralistic approaches to commons theory and its policy application have utility well beyond the lobster case.

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A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: consolidation without consensus

Cited by 126 publications

References 4 publications

Improving or overturning the ITQ system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries

Improving or overturning the ITQ system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries

Renegotiating property rights in the Florida golden crab fishery

Revisiting Maine’s lobster commons: rescaling political subjects

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