A causal model of the meaning of cause, enable, and prevent

Sloman, Steven A.; Barbey, Aron K.; Chaigneau, Sergio E.

doi:10.1037/e527352012-102

Cited by 24 publications

(41 citation statements)

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“…Others have similarly argued that discoveries about structure in the world can best be understood probabilistically (e.g., Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008). Several theorists allow for both deterministic and probabilistic causal relations (e.g., Gopnik et al, 2004;Sloman, Barbey, & Hotaling, 2009). And Sloman et al show how a model based on forces that work together or oppose one another (Barbey & Wolff, 2007;cf.…”

Section: Probabilistic Theories Of Causationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In some cases, a single refutation suffices; it depends on how many other causes, enablers, or disablers, an assertion brings to mind (Sloman, personal communications, 06/ 24/2008 and09/29/2008). Sloman et al (2009) have recently proposed that an enabler implies an accessory cause, i.e., the causal role of an enabler can only be fully understood with reference to the cause it relates to. Additionally, a particular enabler is regarded as an instance of a category of events that come together with a cause to produce a particular outcome.…”

Section: The Refutation Of Causal Claimsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is everyday causation deterministic or probabilistic?

Frosch

Johnson‐Laird

2011

Acta Psychologica

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One view of causation is deterministic: A causes B means that whenever A occurs, B occurs. An alternative view is that causation is probabilistic: the assertion means that given A, the probability of B is greater than some criterion, such as the probability of B given not-A. Evidence about the induction of causal relations cannot readily decide between these alternative accounts, and so we examined how people refute causal assertions. In four experiments most participants judged that a single counterexample of A and not-B refuted assertions of the form, A causes B. And, as a deterministic theory based on mental models predicted, participants were more likely to request multiple refutations for assertions of the form, A enables B. Similarly, refutations of the form not-A and B were more frequent for enabling than causal assertions. Causation in daily life seems to be a deterministic concept.

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Section: Probabilistic Theories Of Causationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Refutation Of Causal Claimsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is everyday causation deterministic or probabilistic?

Frosch

Johnson‐Laird

2011

Acta Psychologica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Double preventions are one type of chain in which different instantiations of forces can lead to different conclusions. As argued by several researchers, the composition of two PREVENT relations sometimes leads to CAUSE relations and other times to ALLOW relations (Barbey & Wolff, 2006, 2009Chaigneau & Barbey, 2008;McGrath, 2003;Sloman et al, 2009). The force theory allows for both of these possible interpretations, as illustrated by the pair of configurations shown in Figure 7.…”

Section: Accounting For Multiple Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, in the animation depicting double prevention in Figures 4 and 5, we can say either the absence of car B allowed car C to cross the line or the presence of car A allowed car C to cross the line. Following prior work in philosophy (Foot, 1967;McGrath, 2003;McMahan, 1993), psychology (Barbey & Wolff, 2006, 2009Chaigneau & Barbey, 2008;Sloman et al, 2009;Wolff, 2007), and linguistics (Talmy, 1988), we propose that the concept of ALLOW is necessarily based on double prevention.…”

Section: Causementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Each arc is associated with a set of conditional probabilities in conjunction with assumptions about the effects of actual or hypothetical interventions (Schulz et al, 2007;Sloman, 2005;Woodward, 2003Woodward, , 2007. A recent account called the causal model theory shows how a Bayesian network approach to causation can be applied to the representation of CAUSE, ALLOW, and PREVENT, as well as causation by omission (Sloman, Barbey, & Hotaling, 2009). A more detailed description of the causal model theory, as well as the other dependency theories, is provided in Appendix B.…”

Section: Dependency Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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For want of a nail: How absences cause events.

Wolff

Barbey

Hausknecht

2010

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Self Cite

109

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Causation by omission is instantiated when an effect occurs from an absence, as in The absence of nicotine causes withdrawal or Not watering the plant caused it to wilt. The phenomenon has been viewed as an insurmountable problem for process theories of causation, which specify causation in terms of conserved quantities, like force, but not for theories that specify causation in terms of statistical or counterfactual dependencies. A new account of causation challenges these assumptions. According to the force theory, absences are causal when the removal of a force leads to an effect. Evidence in support of this account was found in 3 experiments in which people classified animations of complex causal chains involving force removal, as well as chains involving virtual forces, that is, forces that were anticipated but never realized. In a 4th experiment, the force theory's ability to predict synonymy relationships between different types of causal expressions provided further evidence for this theory over dependency theories. The findings show not only how causation by omission can be grounded in the physical world but also why only certain absences, among the potentially infinite number of absences, are causal.

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Consumer Judgment of Morally-Questionable Behaviors: The Relationship Between Ethical and Legal Judgments

Sobolev

Voege

2019

J Bus Ethics

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Consumers' engagement in morally-questionable behaviors poses a serious threat to firms. To further the understanding of consumers' behavior, this study explores the association and conflicts between their ethical and legal judgments. In addition, it examines the way consumers' judgments depend on their mind-sets and the legal liability criterion of action (activity). In two experiments, participants were asked to judge the ethicality and legality of consumers' morally-questionable behaviors. Behavior activity and participants' mind-sets were manipulated. The results show that consumers are more likely to judge a behavior to be legal when they consider it ethical than when they consider it unethical. Nevertheless, conflicts between ethical and legal judgments are prevalent. Furthermore, ethical judgments, legal judgments, and the occurrence of conflicts between them depend on activity and on consumers' mind-sets. Finally, consumers report uncertainty about the ethicality and legality of a wide range of morally-questionable behaviors. Thus, the results paint a picture of individuals who perceive the law to be often beyond their reach or in conflict with their ethical principles. They portray both ethical and legal judgments as dynamically-changing, subjective, and context-dependent. Theoretical contribution and business applications are discussed.

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A causal model of the meaning of cause, enable, and prevent

Cited by 24 publications

References 0 publications

Is everyday causation deterministic or probabilistic?

Is everyday causation deterministic or probabilistic?

For want of a nail: How absences cause events.

Consumer Judgment of Morally-Questionable Behaviors: The Relationship Between Ethical and Legal Judgments

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