Children between 5 and 8 years of age freely intervened on a three-variable causal system, with their task being to discover whether it was a common cause structure or one of two causal chains. From 6 or 7 years of age, children were able to use information from their interventions to correctly disambiguate the structure of a causal chain. We used a Bayesian model to examine children's interventions on the system; this showed that with development children became more efficient in producing the interventions needed to disambiguate the causal structure and that the quality of interventions, as measured by their informativeness, improved developmentally. The latter measure was a significant predictor of children's correct inferences about the causal structure. A second experiment showed that levels of performance were not reduced in a task where children did not select and carry out interventions themselves, indicating no advantage for self-directed learning. However, children's performance was not related to intervention quality in these circumstances, suggesting that children learn in a different way when they carry out interventions themselves.
Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether - under conditions where such inferences might be expected - the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a "less-is-more effect"). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.
Using 3 experiments, we examine whether simple pairwise comparison judgments, involving the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), are sensitive to implicit cues to the nature of the comparison required. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that participants frequently choose the recognized option of a pair if asked to make "larger" judgments but are significantly less likely to choose the unrecognized option when asked to make "smaller" judgments. In Experiment 3, we demonstrate that, overall, participants consider recognition to be a more reliable guide to judgments of a magnitude criterion than lack of recognition and that this intuition drives the framing effect. These results support the idea that when making pairwise comparison judgments, inferring that the recognized item is large is simpler than inferring that the unrecognized item is small.
One view of causation is deterministic: A causes B means that whenever A occurs, B occurs. An alternative view is that causation is probabilistic: the assertion means that given A, the probability of B is greater than some criterion, such as the probability of B given not-A. Evidence about the induction of causal relations cannot readily decide between these alternative accounts, and so we examined how people refute causal assertions. In four experiments most participants judged that a single counterexample of A and not-B refuted assertions of the form, A causes B. And, as a deterministic theory based on mental models predicted, participants were more likely to request multiple refutations for assertions of the form, A enables B. Similarly, refutations of the form not-A and B were more frequent for enabling than causal assertions. Causation in daily life seems to be a deterministic concept.
The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children's causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children's causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8 years made causal structure judgments on a three-component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children's causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked.
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