2019
DOI: 10.1109/tvlsi.2019.2892408
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A Calibratable Detector for Invasive Attacks

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Cited by 14 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 16 publications
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“…Rahman et al [23] investigated hardware security technologies based on complementary metal-oxidesemiconductors (CMOSs) and analyzed their response coverage for attacks. Weiner et al [24] and Weiner et al [25] proposed a low-area probing detector as a response to micro-probing security threats and compared it with shield or bus encryption methods in terms of area overhead and latency. Lee et al proposed [26] a robust secure shield structure to respond to invasive attacks, such as focused ion beam (FIB) circuit editing.…”
Section: A Hardware Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Rahman et al [23] investigated hardware security technologies based on complementary metal-oxidesemiconductors (CMOSs) and analyzed their response coverage for attacks. Weiner et al [24] and Weiner et al [25] proposed a low-area probing detector as a response to micro-probing security threats and compared it with shield or bus encryption methods in terms of area overhead and latency. Lee et al proposed [26] a robust secure shield structure to respond to invasive attacks, such as focused ion beam (FIB) circuit editing.…”
Section: A Hardware Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Weiner et al [24] and Weiner et al [25] proposed a low-area probing detector as a response to micro-probing security threats Lee et al proposed [26] a robust secure shield structure to respond to invasive attacks Semi-invasive attack Rahman et al [23] using complementary metal-oxide-semiconductors (CMOSs)…”
Section: Attack Type Countermeasures Invasive Attackmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is a disconnect between the theoretical probing leakage models of the masking community and the practical probing [160] countermeasures described in the literature. For example, probing sensors [168] are only applied to buses, while active shields/meshes are inefficiently used to protect the entire IC. Since probing models and tools can identify nets of interest for an attacker to probe, they can be used to distribute these physical countermeasures in a more efficient way.…”
Section: Evaluation Of Probing Sensors and Physical Countermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This IIoT system is vulnerable across multiple layers. For instance, physical layers are susceptible through invasive hardware attacks [174] and side-channel attacks. Meanwhile, social attacks (e.g., phishing attacks) arise when people operate a CPPS.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%