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Meyer, Steven A.; Naka, Shigeto

doi:10.1023/a:1017969226540

Cited by 58 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 17 publications

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“…Previous studies argue that family and chief, fictive kin, and relatives are the main structure of a traditional society (Uddin et al, 2018). Although some studies suggest the declining domination of the executive (Abney & Lauth, 1998; Meyer & Naka, 1998), the finding asserts the power of the executive in the budgeting process, where the governor, along with the executive team, controls the budget appropriation process (Breunig & Koski, 2020; Goodman, 2007), and the domination is even stronger in a traditional setting. Hence, a hybrid political system such as the SLG has produced a weak legislative body (Ekman, 2009).…”

Section: The Power Of Executive Legislator and Kingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The power struggles of executives and legislators in a kingship budget setting: The role of informal and formal power

Buanaputra

Uddin

2023

Public Administration

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Drawing on the power struggles of executives and legislators in a kingship budget setting, the study sheds light on the role of informal power in budget decisions and what makes one of the key actors more powerful than the other in the budgeting process. The study employs a qualitative case study collecting data through face‐to‐face interviews, observations, and documentary analysis. The paper advances the research stream of budget politics in public administration literature, highlighting the intense exercise of informal power to drive budget decisions. The paper provides evidence that informal power has heavily influenced the interactions between executives and legislators by the King and his fictive kin, exercised by formal and informal mechanisms (e.g., half‐room meetings). Utilizing Weber's traditionalism, we demonstrate that the role of informal power over formal power is especially critical in a context where democratic institutions have no solid foundation.

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Section: The Power Of Executive Legislator and Kingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The power struggles of executives and legislators in a kingship budget setting: The role of informal and formal power

Buanaputra

Uddin

2023

Public Administration

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Do Individual Representatives Influence Government Transfers? Evidence from Japan

Hirano

2011

The Journal of Politics

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Although the conventional wisdom is that representatives to the Japanese Diet are "pipelines" between the national treasury and local constituents, who have great influence over the distribution of central government transfers to and within their districts, the systematic empirical evidence that this influence exists is relatively weak. This paper uses two identification strategies to estimate how much individual Lower House Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) incumbents influence the distribution of government transfers during the period 1977 to 1992: 1) the exogenous change in representation following the midterm deaths of Japanese representatives; 2) the discontinuity surrounding elections where LDP candidates win or lose by very narrow margins. Overall, the influence of politicians on central-to-locality transfers is relatively small. However, the presence of a marginal LDP incumbent leads to about a 10% to 30% increase in per capita central government transfers to the municipalities where the incumbent has substantial electoral support.

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Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council

Lim

Vreeland²

2013

World Pol.

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Do regional hegemons use their power in regional organizations to advance foreign policy objectives? The authors investigate whether Japan leverages its privileged position at the Asian Development Bank (adb) to facilitate project loans for the elected Asian members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a platform from which it seeks to shape global affairs. Analyzing panel data of adb loan disbursements to twenty-four developing member-countries from 1968 to 2009, the authors find that temporary UNSC membership increases adb loans, particularly during the post–1985 period, when Japan asserted greater influence in multilateral organizations. They estimate an average increase of over 30 percent. Because of Japan's checkered history of imperialism, the adb provides a convenient mechanism by which the government can obfuscate favors for politically important countries. Acting through this regional organization enables Japan to reconcile a low-key approach to foreign affairs with the contradictory goal of global activism–leading without appearing unilateralist.

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Cited by 58 publications

References 17 publications

The power struggles of executives and legislators in a kingship budget setting: The role of informal and formal power

The power struggles of executives and legislators in a kingship budget setting: The role of informal and formal power

Do Individual Representatives Influence Government Transfers? Evidence from Japan

Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council

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