The power struggles of executives and legislators in a kingship budget setting: The role of informal and formal power

Abstract

Drawing on the power struggles of executives and legislators in a kingship budget setting, the study sheds light on the role of informal power in budget decisions and what makes one of the key actors more powerful than the other in the budgeting process. The study employs a qualitative case study collecting data through face‐to‐face interviews, observations, and documentary analysis. The paper advances the research stream of budget politics in public administration literature, highlighting the intense exercise of informal power to drive budget decisions. The paper provides evidence that informal power has heavily influenced the interactions between executives and legislators by the King and his fictive kin, exercised by formal and informal mechanisms (e.g., half‐room meetings). Utilizing Weber's traditionalism, we demonstrate that the role of informal power over formal power is especially critical in a context where democratic institutions have no solid foundation.