13. Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalisation of the Public Sphere

Buehler, Michael

doi:10.1355/9789814279918-018

Cited by 70 publications

(28 citation statements)

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“…For example, rules and procedures to elect the local executive leaders (governors, mayors, and district heads) may change over time, but it does not discount the fact that the authority to elect local leaders is no longer monopolized by the political elites in Jakarta as during the Suharto regime. 11 …”

Section: Composite-standard Model Of Path Dependencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…10 In the case of Indonesia, based on the country's legal system, the microlevel institutions can be found in law, presidential decree, ministerial decree, and government regulation in lieu of law. 11 This does not mean that the political elites in Jakarta are completely powerless. For example, leaders of political parties at the national level have the power to issue the party endorsement letter.…”

Section: A Increasing Returns and Layeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They elected any candidates who were willing to give them more money, and they ignored the instruction from the national parties' leadership. Thus, the parties' leadership at the national level faced difficulties in ensuring that the local legislature elects the nominee endorsed by the national-level party leadership [11]. 13 The plan for recentralization, however, never materialized for two reasons.…”

Section: A Increasing Returns and Layeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The national elites were able to modify the rules and procedures for electing local executive leaders by tapping into negative public sentiment over the behavior of local legislators who exploited their authority to elect local executive leaders for their personal economic interests. The national elites argued that the direct local elections would improve the vertical accountability between the elected executive leaders and the public [11]. The national elites' real motivation, however, was to regain their control over the subnational elites, second term.…”

Section: A Increasing Returns and Layeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This time, the money politics occurs not between the candidates and the local legislatures, but between candidates and political parties, as well as between candidates and the voters. 16 The second negative consequence, related to the practice of money politics, is that the overall costs that need to be borne by any candidates who join the direct local elections have increased at an unprecedented level [11]. Candidates realize that the financial costs for running in direct local elections are part of their "investment."…”

Section: A Increasing Returns and Layeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Institutional Foundation of the Emergence of Subnational Political Dynasties in Indonesia

Kenawas¹

2018

Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017)

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Abstract-Decentralization and democratization at the subnational level are two main policies to avoid another centralization of power in the hands of a small number of elites in Jakarta. Instead of solving the problem of concentration of power, the introduction of decentralization and democratization at the subnational level allows some local strongmen to monopolize power at the subnational level through the formation of political dynasties. Why has this contradictory result occurred? The paper argues that the interaction between macrolevel institutional stability and micro-level continuous institutional transformations creates an avenue for power monopolization by a small number of elites at the subnational level. By applying Taylor C. Boas' composite-standard model of path dependence, the paper aims to show that the institutional development not only precedes the rise of subnational political dynasties but also enables such political force to be an enduring feature of Indonesia's political landscape for years to come. Additionally, by using the composite-standard model, the paper aims to capture the complexity and the dynamics of the power struggle between the competing political actors-both at the national and subnational levels-to change or to maintain the existing institutions. This paper supplements some previous studies on the emergence of political dynasties in Indonesia with a more detailed discussion on the institutional aspects that allows such dynasties to exist and to persist. This paper employs secondary data from various sources, including news archives and the Constitutional Court's proceedings to support its claim.

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Section: Composite-standard Model Of Path Dependencementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Increasing Returns and Layeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Increasing Returns and Layeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Increasing Returns and Layeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Increasing Returns and Layeringmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The Institutional Foundation of the Emergence of Subnational Political Dynasties in Indonesia

Kenawas¹

2018

Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017)

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Governance and Governability: The Small-Scale Purse Seine Fishery in Pulau Rote, Eastern Indonesia

Prescott¹,

Riwu

Steenbergen

et al. 2015

MARE Publication Series

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Rote is Indonesia's southern-most island with a population of approximately 128,000 people. Largely unregulated small-scale fi sheries are integral to local livelihood strategies. Local catches are highly diverse, which refl ects regional biodiversity and mixed fi shing strategies. Rote's four mile coastal marine zone open to local smallscale fi sheries is porous, resulting in competition against fi shers from outside the district. Beyond these four miles local fi shers compete against large-scale fi shing operations for declining resources. To maintain fi sheries sustainability and improve fi shing-dependant livelihoods, improved governance is needed. Aligning with the interactive governance framework, this chapter examines a small-scale purse seine fi shery operating around Rote waters, looking in particular at the implications of governance change through a coherent, carefully prioritized, reform scheme of investment and management. We argue that the major challenges to effective governance frameworks for small-scale fi sheries in Rote include: (i) poor information fl ow that impedes new discourses on the comparative advantages of alternative arrangements leaving governing bodies consistently confronted by wicked problems; (ii) local attitudes towards compliance with fi sheries laws and a limited capacity for enforcement; and (iii) a hierarchical governance system characterized by insecure tenure and competing governance priorities. We also present and argue for some likely pathways to improved governance.

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How and When Do Policymakers Use Evidence? Taking Politics into Account

Jackson¹,

Purnawati²,

Shaxson

2018

Knowledge, Politics and Policymaking in Indonesia

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13. Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalisation of the Public Sphere

Cited by 70 publications

References 0 publications

The Institutional Foundation of the Emergence of Subnational Political Dynasties in Indonesia

The Institutional Foundation of the Emergence of Subnational Political Dynasties in Indonesia

Governance and Governability: The Small-Scale Purse Seine Fishery in Pulau Rote, Eastern Indonesia

How and When Do Policymakers Use Evidence? Taking Politics into Account

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