Relação entre emendas parlamentares e corrupção municipal no Brasil: estudo dos relatórios do programa de fiscalização da Controladoria-Geral da União

Abstract

Estudos recentes sobre corrupção (Elliott, 2002; Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 2002) indicam relação significativa entre transferência intergovernamental de recursos orçamentários via emendas parlamentares e incidentes de corrupção nas instâncias locais de governo. Quatro são as explicações, não excludentes, para a existência desta correlação: (i) aumento no ganho potencial do ato corrupto; (ii) aumento do poder discricionário local; (iii) aumento da pressão de rent-seekers e; (iv) conluio com corrupção federal. Utilizando dados do Programa de Fiscalização a partir de Sorteios Públicos da Controladoria-Geral da União, o presente trabalho busca estudar as relações existentes entre emendas parlamentares e os episódios de corrupção municipal no Brasil. A análise formal estatística, que utiliza uma série de variáveis de controle sociodemográficas e político-partidárias de interesse, sugere que, em média, municípios que recebem emendas parlamentares apresentam uma incidência 25% maior de episódios de corrupção. Os resultados indicam que os eventos de corrupção municipal se correlacionam mais com o fato de o município receber ou não emendas parlamentares (quantidade de emendas) e menos com o volume de recursos repassados. Neste sentido, o estudo apontaria as explicações (iii) e (iv) para a questão central da pesquisa.

Fatores associados ao desperdício de recursos da saúde repassados pela união aos municípios auditados pela Controladoria Geral da União

“…Furthermore, passive waste can be used to conceal active waste, as noted by Sodré and Alves (2010). As a practical consequence of this study, theoretical and empirical arguments have been identified that suggest that passive waste can be reduced through a series of actions such as (i) increased supervision, (ii) greater transparency of information related to government programs (functioning and execution) so as to make public sector information effectively accessible and understandable to citizens, (iii) implementation of training and motivation programs for civil servants and public managers, thus helping them internalize the importance of proper professional practice and seeking to create a culture of whistleblowing regarding irregularities practiced in public service, (iv) conducting an analysis to determine whether a service should be provided by the government itself or be outsourced and (v) implementation of new governance mechanisms and strengthening of existing mechanisms such as the CGU audit, which could reduce both active and passive waste.…”

“…Other studies that addressed this issue were conducted by Hart et al (1997), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Reinikka and Svensson (2005), Moreira (2008, 2012), Sodré and Alves (2010) and Motta (2010). It should be noted that according to Bandiera et al (2009), the theory dealing with passive waste is newer and less developed than that dealing with active waste.…”

“…They concluded that active and passive waste not only led to significant reductions in students' scores on these tests but that they also affected school indicators, reducing the approval rate and increasing the student dropout rate. Sodré and Alves (2010), researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Brasília (Universidade de Brasília -UnB) and the CGU, reviewed the audit reports of the CGU public lottery seeking to verify the relationship between parliamentary amendments and signs of municipal corruption found in the reports. At the end of the study, the authors concluded that municipalities that obtained funds from such amendments have 25% more cases of corruption on average than municipalities that did not obtain such funds.…”

“…The occurrence of active and passive waste of funds in public administration at the national and international levels has been documented in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Reinikka and Svensson (2005), Ferraz et al (2008Ferraz et al ( , 2012, Bandiera et al (2009), Sodré andAlves (2010) and Motta (2010). Data on such waste can also be found in the reports of the Office of the Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da União -CGU), which has conducted on-site inspections in Brazilian municipalities with up to 500,000 inhabitants since 2003.…”

Desafios políticos para a consolidação do Sistema Único de Saúde: uma abordagem histórica

“…The April 1977 laws, which were passed with the intention of weakening the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), which was gaining ground on the pro-military Arena party, also facilitated the proliferation of political parties. 4 The sheer number of parties that existed after the return to democracy formed the basis for what Sérgio Abranches (1988) called "coalition presidentialism", referring to the difficulty of forming a majority in the legislature, such that alliances with an ever greater number of political parties have to be forged, resulting in the dilution of the programs intended by the party of the elected president, and more power for conservative forces within governments (Limongi, Figueiredo, 1998;Arretche, Rodden, 2004;Sodré, Alves, 2010). These features of the Brazilian political and electoral system help explain how change in the country has been limited and give an understanding of why, upon creating SUS, the 1988 Constitution also maintained a large private healthcare system to compete with it, counting on all the fiscal privileges it had had since the military regime, a rare state of affairs in countries that create public, universal health systems (Rodrigues, Santos, 2011).…”