Governance structure and transaction cost: relationship between strategy and asset specificity

Abstract

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the determining factors of governance structures, using the transaction cost approach. The coexistence of distinct structures in the same production chain, whose assets show no difference in terms of specificity, is a problematic challenge for transaction cost economics, since it predicts a convergence towards the most efficient structures. The research is pure and explanatory and seeks to identify the determining or contributing variables to the occurrence of the phenomena. Thus, the research source is documental, encompassing the literature discussing the relation between governance structure and transaction cost. Resumo O objetivo do artigo é discutir teoricamente quais os fatores que determinam as estruturas de governança a partir da abordagem dos custos de transação. A coexistência de estruturas distintas numa mesma

Conclusion: Digitization and the Continuities of Change in Administrative Information Processing

“…In his pioneering study “The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business,” Alfred D. Chandler (1977) traced the emergence of the modern multiunit business enterprise that fundamentally transformed the U.S. economy in the decades between 1840 and 1920. He argued that these hierarchically organized enterprises resulted from a trend that gave administrative coordination an advantage over market mechanisms in securing greater productivity, lower costs, and higher profits (for a transaction cost perspective on this issue, see, for example, da Silva & Saes, 2007; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1991 and, for a critical view, Simon, 1995). Although Chandler focused on organizational rather than technical development, his study indicated that the economic advantage of administrative coordination depended on technological innovations, above all the railroad, the telegraph, and the telephone.…”

Concentração de propriedade e desempenho: um estudo nas empresas brasileiras de capital aberto do setor de energia elétrica

“…Silva & Saes (2007) claim that, in order to reach an efficient governance structure, inefficient structures must be expelled. The time that will be expended and the difficulties that will be faced will depend on the company's rules -formal or informal ones -, which end up privileging certain structures.…”

The Distribution of Residual Controls and Risk Sharing: A Case Study of Farmland Transfer in China

“…Since the mid-late 1990s, the contract structure of the agricultural shareholding in a cooperative system [8], the development of agricultural industrialization [9,10] and the choice of organizational patterns [11,12] have been the key issues of transaction cost economics. Due to the underdevelopment of formal agricultural finance and insurance in China, the contracts of production, processing, and sale with firms are adopted by farmers to avoid agricultural contract risks [13].…”