Nuclear governance in Latin America

Dawood, Layla; Herz, Mônica

doi:10.1590/s0102-85292013000200007

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…Prominent here are Hirst and Bocco (1989), Solingen (1996), de Andrade (2006), Alcañiz (2010), de Jesus (2011), Mallea (2012, Merke (2012), Patti (2013), Dawood and Herz (2013), Lima (2013a), Hurtado (2014) and Gadano (2014), among others. We also have the meticulous report of Carsales and Ornstein (1998) on Argentinian nuclear co-operation during the 1990s.…”

Section: The Evolution Of International Nuclear Co-operation Between mentioning

confidence: 95%

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International Co-operation in Science and Technology: Concepts, Politics, and Dynamics in the Case of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Co-operation

Malacalza

2016

Contexto int.

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This article discusses the political dynamic of agenda-setting in the subfield of international nuclear co-operation, within an analytical framework that integrates the literature on international co-operation in science and technology, international nuclear co-operation, and foreign policy analysis. It presents the emblematic case of Argentine-Brazilian co-operation about the construction of two multipurpose reactors, whose process of decision-making has been disputed by officials, technological firms, managers, and nuclear scientists. It also underlines that economic and commercial motivations prevail in the process of international co-operation.

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Section: The Evolution Of International Nuclear Co-operation Between mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Brazil holds 5% of world uranium reserves, Argentina has tried to double its nuclear energy production, and Mexico plans to build eight more power reactors by 2025. However, according to Dawood and Herz (2013), there are some economic problems in the mining industry that make it difficult to reduce the regional dependence on hydrocarbons and hydroelectricity.…”

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confidence: 99%

International Co-operation in Science and Technology: Concepts, Politics, and Dynamics in the Case of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Co-operation

Malacalza

2016

Contexto int.

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“…Así, dan forma a una arquitectura internacional que busca prevenir la proliferación de armamento atómico, alentar la "nuclear safety" y garantizar la "nuclear security" (Guerra, 2019). Además contemplan la gestión colectiva y cooperativa de generación de bienes públicos como ciencia y tecnología nuclear, el cuidado del ambiente (Dawood y Herz, 2013), y el rastreo y disuasión del tráfico ilegal de materiales nucleares y radiactivos.…”

Section: El Orden Nuclear: Principios Instituciones E Instrumentosunclassified

Orden Nuclear en jaque... ¿Por parte de quién? | The Nuclear Order in check... by whom?

Vera,

Colombo,

Guglielminotti

2023

RMI

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¿Cuándo se debilita o entra en contradicción un régimen u orden internacional? ¿Por qué se dice que el orden nuclear internacional actual está en crisis? Este artículo trata de abordar posibles respuestas a estas preguntas para contribuir al debate en torno al aparente debilitamiento del Régimen Internacional de No Proliferación. Para ello analiza dos casos particulares: por un lado, el acuerdo de 2005 entre Estados Unidos y la India, y el posterior apoyo a la entrada de esta última al Grupo de Proveedores Nucleares; por otro, la alianza militar AUKUS constituida en torno a la provisión de submarinos a propulsión nuclear por parte de Estados Unidos y Reino Unido a Australia, lo cual no está exento de riesgos de proliferación. El artículo sostiene que el debilitamiento del orden nuclear no está ocurriendo solo por las posibilidades de proliferación de países como Irán, sino también por las contradicciones de las propias potencias nucleares. Recibido el: 28 de febrero. 2023 | Aceptado el: 25 oct. 2023.

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“…Therefore, it is possible that opposing the Additional Protocol actually is becoming a burden in itself, standing in the way of an easier path to Brazil's nuclear submarines (Dawood and Herz 2013;Kassenova 2014). It might be worth for Brazil's political and military leadership to take a fresh look at this matter.…”

Section: A New Look At the Additional Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Brazil’s Nuclear Submarine: A Broader Approach to the Safeguards Issue

Costa

2017

Rev. bras. polít. int.

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• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados. AbstractThe article discusses the issue of nuclear-propelled submarines as a nuclear non-proliferation question, addresses the issue of safeguards procedures and arrangements, and suggests a broader, political approach to allay international concerns. Such safeguards arrangement would set the precedent for future arrangements, and particularly if integrated into a more comprehensive approach, might strengthen Brazil's hand in nuclear negotiations, including on disarmament.Keywords: Nuclear submarines, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safeguards, Brazil, International Atomic Energy Agency, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Introduction N uclear propulsion for military use, more frequently in submarines, is considered a loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation regime (Ma & Von Hippel, 2001;Moltz 1998;2005;Thielmann and Hoffman 2012); for a different view, see Guimarães 2005). That is is because nuclear propulsion for military craft isa Non-Proscribed Military Activity (NPMA), and the nuclear material used in reactors for that specific purpose is not subject to safeguards. During the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -NPT, -it became clear that some prospective members might not join it out of interest in nuclear propulsion for ships and concern about how NPT might impact that. Should safeguards be applied in that case, much of the discretion that is the raison d'être of a submarine in the first place would be compromised or forfeited. But even then, in the late 1960s, it was already considered "a serious loophole in the safeguards prescribed by the Treaty") (Fischer 1997, 272) because during the unsafeguarded periods of its life-cycle, the nuclear material in the reactor could be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons. The risk increases with the degree of enrichment of the nuclear material: if the uranium in the reactor is enriched to around 90% 235 U (usually called weapons-grade uranium 1 ), it could be directly used in nuclear weapons; if it is enriched to around 20% or more 235 U (usually referred to highly-enriched uranium or HEU), it could easily be enriched to weapon-grade uranium. Uranium enriched to less than 20% 235 U is usually called low-enriched uranium or LEU and, at a level below 10% 235 U, it becomes more difficult to substantially enrich to weapons-grade uranium 2 or close to it (Barroso 2009;Bernstein 2008;Bodansky 2004;Heriot 1988;Murray 2001) 3 . Uranium for land-based nuclear reactors is usually enriched to around 3.5%-5% 235 U. Therefore, from a nuclear nonproliferation standpoint, risks would be minimized if naval nuclear reactors had LEU, and particularly less than 10% 235 U content, as its nuclear fissile material. Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz CostaAs a practical matter, this w...

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Nuclear governance in Latin America

Cited by 7 publications

References 11 publications

International Co-operation in Science and Technology: Concepts, Politics, and Dynamics in the Case of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Co-operation

International Co-operation in Science and Technology: Concepts, Politics, and Dynamics in the Case of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Co-operation

Orden Nuclear en jaque... ¿Por parte de quién? | The Nuclear Order in check... by whom?

Brazil’s Nuclear Submarine: A Broader Approach to the Safeguards Issue

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