Uma teoria da preponderância do Poder Executivo: o sistema de comissões no Legislativo brasileiro

Unionism, the Decision-Making Process and Social Security Reform in Brazil

“…In the Brazilian institutional arrangement, the minority has no way to prevent matters contrary to its interests from being considered and voted on directly in the House. In other words, the system of commissions was not designed to veto (DINIZ, 1999;FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 2001;PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2000).…”

Beyond Brazilian Coalition Presidentialism: the Appropriation of the Legislative Agenda

“…The works in Congress also interfere with the processing rate desired by the Executive. By studying the mechanisms of acceleration of the presidential agenda, Pereira and Mueller (2000) observed that the prerogative to request urgency in discussing propositions can vary according to the differences between the interest shown by the committees and the President. The smaller these preferences, the smaller would be the need to speed up work.…”

Lawmaking by the Brazilian National Congress: Cooperation, leadership, and impasse between Brazil’s Legislative and Executive branches

“…instruments specified in the 1988 Constitution is central to the other side of the debate. Coalition presidentialism (where the ability to implement a government agenda depends on the strategic decisions of the President to build a coalition government) enhances governability, and the predominance of the Executive is a result of the President's greater access to legislative resources (Abranches, 1988;Pereira and Mueller, 2000;Amorim Neto, Cox and McCubbins, 2003;Santos, 2003). Consequently, the agenda and resulting legislation are strikingly national in scope, since the Executive tends to respond to national demands, and lawmakers tend to signal their preferences to the electorate by supporting-or not-the coalition government (Amorim Neto and Santos, 2003).…”