The death and resurrection of 'economics with psychology': remarks from a methodological standpoint

Abstract

One of the merits of contemporary economic analysis is its capacity to offer accounts of choice behavior that dispense with details of the complex decision machinery. The starting point of this paper is the concern with the important methodological debate about whether economics might offer accurate predictions and explanations of actual behavior without any reference to psychological presuppositions. Inspired by an exercise of rational reconstruction of ideas, I aim to offer an interpretation of the process of freeing economic analysis from psychology at the end of the 19 th century and the contemporary resurrection of behavioral approaches in the late 1980s.

Paul A. Samuelson: teorie projevených preferencí a její využití v teorii indexů

“…bez využití indiferenčních křivek a všech jejich restriktivních předpokladů. Muramatsu (2009) uvádí, že Samuelsonova formulace projevených preferencí poskytuje přirozený vztah mezi poptávkovou funkcí a individuálními preferencemi (pozorovanými volbami) a podle Samuelsonovy hypotézy je očekáváno, že spotřebitelé volí to, co chtějí, neboť to, co chtějí, si aktuálně volí. 7 Teorie projevených preferencí dnes tvoří součást standardního výkladu mikroekonomické teorie a analýzy, přičemž její výklad je spojen s dvěma axiomy, a to tzv.…”

Seleção de pacotes de respostas envolvendo ganhos e perdas de tokens com ratos: Um estudo experimental dentro da análise do comportamento econômico

“…The relevance of this finding to economics is that it violates a basic understanding (axiom) about human behavior that is fundamental to economic (neoclassical) theory: that people have stable, well-defined preferences, and make choices consistent with these preferences (Tversky & that economists should "get rid of psychological presuppositions" and adopt an "operationalist methodology", in which preferences must be derived from actually observed choices. The general idea is that, once preferences have been systematically identified, they can be used to predict future choices as long as a set of axioms about human nature ("rationality") holds true (Muramatsu, 2009). The already mentioned assumption on choice stability is one of these axioms.…”

“…The already mentioned assumption on choice stability is one of these axioms. This pragmatic approach has been a target of constant criticism from behavioral economists (from all backgrounds), who advocate that (1) the axioms of human rationality are unrealistic and do not stand experimental testing; and (2) the explanatory and predictive powers of economic models can strongly improve with a better understanding of the behavioral processes that determine human choices (Muramatsu, 2009).…”