Economias De Escala E Escopo Na Previdência Complementar Fechada Brasileira

Abstract

Este trabalho identifica a existência de economias de escala e escopo na previdência complementar fechada brasileira por meio da realização de um conjunto de testes quantitativos realizados sobre a base de dados administrativos disponibilizada pelo Ministério da Previdência Social. Serão apresentados a revisão da literatura internacional, as estatísticas descritivas da base de dados, o modelo teórico para existência de economias de escala em previdência complementar fechada, os métodos quantitativos aplicados, seus respectivos resultados e uma seção com implicações normativas. Os resultados econométricos apontam para a existência de economias de escala na previdência complementar fechada brasileira mais expressiva que na literatura internacional.

Sponsor Bias in Pension Fund Administrative Expenses: The Brazilian Experience

“…In the second column, labeled Model 1, we include only the main drivers of administrative expenses, that is, population and assets, as proposed by Mitchell and Andrews (1981), adding the number of plans and a dummy for public EFPC. We confirm the finding by Abi-Ramia et al (2015), that there is a sponsor bias for public EPFC in Brazil, denoted by positive and statistically significant (at 0.1% level) coefficient for the dummy public. Bikker et al (2012) also obtained this sponsor bias for pension funds with state or provincial government sponsors.…”

“…Previous literature (Abi-Ramia, Boueri, & Sachsida, 2015;Bikker et al, 2012) reported that pension funds with public organizations as sponsors present greater administrative expenses. We investigated this sponsor bias, and presented evidence that it may be attributed, at least partially, to omitted variables, particularly variables to control for location and the level of services outsourcing by the pension funds.…”

“…It also ceases, after controlling for these variables, if a state government organization is the sponsor; remaining essentially for EFPC with federal government as the sponsor. Both controls, for location and outsourcing level, were omitted by Abi-Ramia et al (2015). The control for outsourcing level was omitted by Bikker et al (2012), and in our analysis it appears more relevant to account for sponsor bias.…”

“…We refer to this difference between public and nonpublic sponsored fund as sponsor bias, which is the point that we aim to investigate deeper in the present study. Abi-Ramia et al (2015), as well as Bikker et al (2012), use panel data analysis on a model similar to equation (2), but for a sample of Brazilian EFPC (closed pension funds), in years 2010 and 2011. Each observation is identified by a fund index and by a time (year) index, as expressed in equation 3, where all variables and parameters follow the same description as in equation (2).…”

“…BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 15, n. 1, art. 3, e170072, 2018 www.anpad.org.br/bar Bikker et al (2012), for Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States, and Abi-Ramia, Boueri and Sachsida (2015), for Brazil, have reported a sponsor bias in administrative expenses of closed pension funds. Both studies show evidence that funds with public sponsors (either state-owned companies or local governments) present greater administrative expenses, after controlling for assets, number of participants and fund characteristics.…”