“…Despite these characteristics of the Brazilian capital market, it is observed in the national literature the presence of studies that investigate the relationship between executive compensation and performance based on the type I agency problem involving the relationship between the principal and the agent (Konraht et al, 2018;Braga & Pimentel, 2017;Souza et al, 2017), a typical aspect of capital markets of Anglo-Saxon countries (Baixauli-Soler & Sanches-Marin, 2015;Young et al, 2008). As a way of differentiating, the present research was conducted considering the characteristics of the Brazilian capital market having as a foundation the type II agency problem that involves the relationship between majority and minority shareholders, the concentration of ownership, and the presence of family control in companies present in the [B] 3 (Bortolon & Silva Junior, 2015;Baixauli-Soler & Sanches-Marin, 2015;KPMG, 2015;Velloso & Grisci, 2014;Costa et al, 2014;Carvalhal, 2014;Pinto & Leal, 2012;Leal & Bortolon, 2009;Young et al, 2008;Sarlo Neto et al, 2005;Nóbrega et al, 2000).…”