Against Autonomy: Why Practical Reason Cannot Be Pure

Abstract

The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this

Does morality require sameness?: a response and question to Jennifer Frey

“…The perspective of pure practical reason does not respect this fact, and for that reason it is not truly a practical perspective that concern what can be pursued and realized at all" (Frey 2018, p. 188) 7 " [...] what constitutes the practical good (what Aristotle calls the prakton agathon) must be ends that are realizable by the very agents who cognize and desire them. Call this the realizability requirement on the practical good" (Frey 2018, p. 178) Manuscrito -Rev. Int.…”

“…In a previous issue in this journal, Jennifer Frey (2018) presented three arguments proving that New-Kantian approaches in ethics are fundamentally flawed. First of all she argued Kantians are unfaithful to the grammar of the good, secondly that they look for universality in the domain of practice where none is to be found, and finally that there is a contradiction between the demand for universality and the diverse practical capabilities of rational agents.…”