Happiness as the constitutive principle of action in Thomas Aquinas

Frey, Jennifer A.

doi:10.1080/13869795.2019.1599051

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…In the next section, I will outline Thompson's analysis of naïve action explanation. In section 3, I will offer a new interpretation of such naïve action explanation, where A and B are two different non-simultaneous parts of a complex action 8 . This interpretation was articulated and given an initial analysis by Anton Ford (2018: 177).…”

Section: • •59mentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action

Zheng¹

2021

Journal of Human Cognition

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Ordinary action explanation formulated as "I am doing A because I am doing B" is explanation of an action in terms of another action-inprogress. According to Michael Thompson, the explained action is a teleological part of the explaining complex action, which is composed of different parts. Thompson's analysis focuses on the partwhole relation between the explained action and the explaining action, thus ignores a possibility: these two actions can be two different parts of a complex action. I shall argue that the interrelation between different parts of a complex action corresponds to a new kind of action explanation of the formulas: "I am doing A because I am doing B" and "I am doing B because I have done A", where A and B are two different parts of a complex action. This kind of action explanation is associated with the temporal schema of an actiontype, for example, X: First, do A; second, do B; then, C; finally, D. This is an attempt to probe into the inner structure of complex action.

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Section: • •59mentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action

Zheng¹

2021

Journal of Human Cognition

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Constitutivism, Moral

Ferrero¹

2020

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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Moral constitutivism purports to explain moral normativity by appeal to the nature of either agency or rational powers. Ambitious constitutivism aspires to ground the categorical authority of morality and to derive the content of the basic moral norms while avoiding the problems of moral realism. As a general strategy, moral constitutivism faces three serious challenges. First, the shmagency challenge. The worry is that the authority of the norms derived from the nature of agency is only conditional on having a reason to be an agent rather than some other kind of subject, a shmagent or an alienated agent. Constitutivists usually reply by appealing to the inescapability of agency. Second, there is a worry that agency is too thin a basis for the derivation of the substantive content of moral norms. Finally, there is the worry that constitutivism might be unable to make room for bad actions. The entry considers possible responses by moral constitutivism to these concerns and whether, if these responses are unsatisfactory, moral constitutivism might still have some explanatory power but of a less ambitious sort.

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IV: Interlude I: Life and Death

Erk

2022

The Ethics of Killing

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Happiness as the constitutive principle of action in Thomas Aquinas

Cited by 4 publications

References 10 publications

A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action

A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action

Constitutivism, Moral

IV: Interlude I: Life and Death

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