Relational norms and satisfaction with interorganizational cooperation

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to analyze the effects of interorganizational cost management and opportunism on the reflexes of relational norms on satisfaction with interorganizational cooperation in franchised companies. The collective synergy arising from these relationships mainly seeks to increase competitiveness and commercial development. Windolph and Moeller observed that interorganizational cost management increases satisfaction in the relationship with partners, while relational norms attenuate the negative effect on supplier satisfaction. Design/methodology/approach A survey was carried out with managers of franchised companies in the food industry. The managers were identified on the social network Linkedin. After that, an invitation was sent to participate in the research. A total of 88 valid responses were obtained. The questionnaire consists of 40 extracted assertions. A pre-test was carried out to verify the comprehensibility of the wording of the assertions. Structural equation modeling with partial least squares (PLS-SEM) was used for data analysis. For analysis, validation and adequacy tests of the model were carried out, and executed in the software SmartPLS. Findings Survey results reveal that interorganizational cost management increases franchisor relationship satisfaction. Relational social norms mitigate the negative effect of opportunism on satisfaction with cooperation. And interorganizational cost management plays an important role in the relationship between relational norms and satisfaction with cooperation between franchisor and franchisees. Research limitations/implications However, limitations resulting from the methodological design of the research must be considered in the interpretation of the results, at the same time that they provide opportunities for new research. As for the methodological aspects, the study cannot be generalized to other branches of companies, because it is a sector with franchises with specific characteristics. It should also be considered that the study was limited to investigating the proposed model, but other constructs can be observed in the literature. Finally, to empirically assess the constructs of the theoretical model, research instruments from studies other than those considered here can be used. Practical implications This study contributes with relevant literature and the management practice of interorganizational cooperation by empirically demonstrating the importance of interorganizational cost management as a management control mechanism and to mitigate the effects of opportunism between franchisor and franchisees. Social implications It also contributes to the inclusion of social norms in the relationship between franchisor and franchisees with a view to increasing franchisee satisfaction with their franchisor, which also aims to mitigate the impacts of opportunism in this relationship. It contributes to the social order, as they reveal ways to mitigate possible conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and generate greater transparency in the relationship. Originality/value This study is justified by the fact that it investigates relational aspects of cooperation between franchisor and franchisees, a form of interorganizational cooperation that is growing in the market. It is also justified by highlighting the importance of interorganizational cost management as a means of mitigating the opportunistic effects between franchisor and franchisees, proving to be an important management mechanism. Research is especially important because interorganizational strategies have been spreading in corporate environments (Dekker, Ding & Groot, 2016) and the maintenance of the relationship is dependent on satisfaction with cooperation.

Uso de Mecanismos de Controle no Desempenho Colaborativo: Efeitos do Risco Relacional e da Confiança

“…Na Figura 2 evidenciam-se os achados da pesquisa, em que os resultados fornecem suporte total para aceitar as hipóteses H1, H2 e H5, parcial para H6 e rejeitar a H3 e H4. Os mecanismos de controle encorajam tanto compradores como fornecedores a se comprometerem com a relação de troca e promovem relações colaborativas (Anzilago & Beuren, 2022;Liu et al, 2009;Tangpong et al, 2010;Huang & Chiu, 2018). A partir dos resultados, observa-se que mecanismos de controle contratual e relacional atuam como complementos na relação fornecedor-comprador, em vez de substitutos, de forma que as situações não cobertas pelo controle contratual são contempladas pelo controle relacional e vice-versa (Liu et al, 2009).…”

“…O controle contratual, que diz respeito aos contratos estabelecidos em um relacionamento, possui natureza incompleta e estrutura rígida, a qual não apoia flexibilidade, adaptabilidade e autonomia de empresas parceiras (Heide, Wathne & Rokkan, 2007;Zhang et al, 2020;Zhou & Xu, 2012). Embora não contemple todos os cenários possíveis, o controle contratual reduz a probabilidade de condutas oportunistas (Anzilago & Beuren, 2022;Li, Xie, Teo & Peng et al, 2010) e oferece proteção legal às organizações inseridas em alianças estratégicas (Huang & Chiu, 2018). Ao tornar o relacionamento explícito, estipulam-se limites comportamentais e expectativas (Parkhe, 1993).…”

“…O controle relacional trata de aspectos informais, como normas compartilhadas a partir de interações frequentes e repetidas entre as partes (Chakkol, Karatzas, Johnson & Godsell, 2018;Dekker et al, 2019;Zhang et al, 2020). Incentiva a orientação de longo prazo, reprime o oportunismo (Anzilago & Beuren, 2022;Das & Teng, 2001b;Liu et al, 2009;Tangpong, Hung & Ro, 2010) e facilita a troca de conhecimentos, o que contribui para a resolução de conflitos e o desempenho colaborativo (Day, Fawcett, Fawcett & Magnan, 2013). Especialmente nas fases de construção e maturidade das alianças, o controle relacional proporciona maior desempenho colaborativo (Huang & Chiu, 2018), o qual é potencializado pelo uso combinado com os controles contratuais (Liu et al, 2009).…”

“…Segundo Cheng (2011), risco relacional se refere à probabilidade de ocorrerem condutas oportunistas, conflitos disfuncionais e assimetria de poder. O oportunismo representa uma das principais fontes de risco relacional, dado que empresas tendem a perseguir interesses próprios (Anzilago & Beuren, 2022). O conflito disfuncional é caracterizado pela distorção de informações que prejudicam a tomada de decisão, enquanto a assimetria de poder se refere ao controle de uma empresa sobre os recursos que um parceiro necessita (Das & Teng, 2001b).…”

The Satisfaction Analysis of Professional Placement Partners on The Performance of University Students

“…From some of the opinions above, it can be concluded that the customer, in this case, is an agency or company that is a partner of the Professional Placement Program, Relationships between partners/organizations involve organizational values and exchange of information, being a balance of power or even the same level of specific attributes can help this process in which all Professional Placement Program partners will get satisfaction (Anzilago & Beuren, 2022). The Professional Placement Program provides services that include three aspects: the activities' quality and staff responses.…”