This article reviews roles of military forces in Europe in support of civilian authorities in crises caused by natural or manmade incidents and disasters. These roles are shaped by five trendssome in effect since the end of the Cold war, others more recent. These are: transition from civil defence to civil protection; expanding noncombat roles of the armed forces; cooperation with an increasing number of actors; respective proliferation of modes of contribution; and searching ways to contribute to the resilience of both states and local communities. The authors elaborate and provide examples for these five trends and conclude by highlighting some enduring characteristics of the military contributions.
Advanced information and communications technologies (ICT) facilitate the increase of effectiveness and efficiency of defence and security organizations, governmental services, the economy, and quality of life, while at the same time providing opportunities for malicious actors to cause significant damage without exercising physical coercion. Policies for security and resilience of modern societies to threats and risks from the cyberspace account for foreseen cyber threats, their immediate impact on ICT infrastructure, consequent effects on critical services, as well as cascading effects across systems and infrastructures. This paper presents the architecture used to plan and, consequently, manage cybersecurity research in Bulgaria. It covers five application areas (information management systems; industrial control systems; unmanned and remotely piloted vehicles; bio-integrated systems; and cognitive processes and decision-making), the study of systems of systems, and support to the formulation and implementation of cybersecurity policy.
The management of crises triggered by natural or manmade events requires a concerted effort of various actors crossing institutional and geographic boundaries. Technological advances allow to make crisis management more effective, but innovation is hindered by dispersed and often disconnected knowledge on the lessons learned, gaps, and solutions. Taxonomies enable the search for information of potential interest. This article presents a taxonomy of crisis management functions, designed on the basis of a conceptual model integrating the concepts of hazard, vulnerability, risk, and community, and the main consequence- and management-based concepts. At its highest level, the taxonomy includes ten functional areas: preparatory (mitigation, capability development, and strategic adaptiveness), operational (protection, response, and recovery), and common (crisis communications and information management; command, control, and coordination; logistics; and security management). The taxonomy facilitates the navigation of online platforms and the matching of needs and solutions. It has broader applications, e.g., for structuring the assessment of the societal impact of crisis management solutions and as a framework for a comprehensive assessment of disaster risk reduction measures. While the taxonomy was developed within a research and innovation project supported by the European Union, it reflects and is compatible with established international concepts and classification schemes, and is thus applicable by a wider international community.
The effective response to the proliferation and growing diversity and sophistication of cyber threats requires a broad spectrum of competencies, human, technological and financial resources that are in the powers of very few countries. The European Union is addressing this challenge through an initiative to establish one or more cybersecurity competence networks. A number of existing technologies can support collaboration in networked organisations; however, network governance remains a challenge. The study presented in this article aimed to identify and prioritise network governance issues. Towards that purpose, qualitative and quantitative methods were applied in the analysis of norms and regulations, statutory documents of existing networks, academic sources and interviews with representatives of funding organisations and potential major customers. The comprehensiveness and complementarity of these primary sources allowed to identify 33 categories of governance issues and group them in four tiers, indicative of the respective priority level. The results of the study are currently used to inform and orient the development of alternative models for governance of a cybersecurity network and a set of criteria for their evaluation. They will support informed decision-making on the most appropriate governance model of a future networked organisation, evolving from a project consortium.
In 1999-2000, I taught the first defense planning course at the "G.S. Rakovski" Defense and Staff College in Sofia, Bulgaria. All students were senior officers-mostly full colonels-and yet the course had to begin with a thorough explanation of what "defense planning" is and how it differs from and relates to "operational planning." At the time, references to "planning" in regard to the military almost exclusively addressed the intended use of available forces, or what was known as "strategic and operational planning." That is hardly surprising, because-unlike in NATO-defense policy-making and planning in the Warsaw Pact were fully centralized. The capitals, with the exception of Moscow, had either no or very limited knowledge and experience in defense policy and planning. In addition, in the 1990s the defense establishments in the former Warsaw Pact countries and ex-Soviet republics were only a small part of what were immature and generally weak democratic institutions. Even under the impact of declining economies and the lack of an obvious enemy, senior political and military leaders felt safer adhering to inherited force structures and force development models. One result is that, at the time of their accession, very few of the new NATO members had any sizeable contribution to make to the Alliance's capabilities. 1 A reader who is an experienced defense policy maker or defense planner is advised to skip this article. But many defense establishments in Partner countries, as well as in a number of new NATO members, still struggle with the concept of defense policy, the role of civilians in defense, the concept of capability, the linkage between plans and budgets, and the relationship between force development and technological modernization. This article is intended to facilitate an understanding of basic concepts and relationships in defense policy making. It does not provide an algorithm, nor any one-size-fitsall templates of processes and documents. The figures included in this article are intended to illustrate relationships, and not algorithmic steps. Nevertheless, I hope that it
Abstract:The article presents the major findings of a comprehensive study (White
Abstract:Advanced approaches towards defense management, and the process of the ongoing force transformation in particular, rely to a great extent on CapabilitiesBased Planning (CBP) to provide for robust response to a broad spectrum of threats and challenges. Our assumption is that CBP has considerable potential to enhance initiatives for security sector transformation. This paper outlines a planning framework, based on centralized planning and agency-based development of security sector capabilities. It links objectives, security ambitions, planning scenarios, tasks, required and affordable capabilities, and planning risks. The distribution of capabilities among security sector organizations accounts for their traditions, experience, and current roles, but focuses on cost effectiveness. The development of capabilities is subject to regular monitoring, assessment of gaps and risks, and coordinated decision making on corrective measures. Then, the paper presents possible levels of integration of the security sector. The conclusion is that coordinated capability development, with capabilities-based planning as its central feature, should be seen as the core process in security sector transformation.
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