No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

This study develops an integrated model to investigate the economic and environmental effects of a unilateral maritime emission regulation vis-à-vis a uniform maritime emission regulation. The proposed model explicitly incorporates the effects of competition between regional ports and between shipping companies, and captures operational considerations such as the inventory costs of in-transit cargo, and the tradeoff between enlarged fleet size and slow steaming. The behaviors of shipping companies and ports are modeled in a two-stage game so that market equilibria under alternative regulations can be solved and compared. The findings suggest that a unilateral regulation may actually lead to an increase in total emissions, whereas a uniform regulation always reduces total emissions. Under either type of regulation, there can be asymmetric effects on shipping companies and ports. Therefore, regulators and the maritime industry need to strike a balance between emission reduction and fair competition. Our study cautions against unilateral regulations, and emphasizes the importance to take into account the effects of alternative emission policies on the operations of shipping companies and ports.

This paper investigates the design issues of a shipping network when cargo demand increases rapidly. A gravity-type model for origindestination (OD) demand estimation is first presented and calibrated based on the current cargo volumes of the Indonesian maritime market. A model for minimizing total system cost, which is the sum of shippers' and carriers' costs, is then proposed to design the shipping network with cargo demand levels forecasted for future years. The results show that for the Indonesian maritime market, although a hub-and-spoke (HS) network is appropriate for the current low level of shipping demand, a point-to-point (PoP) structure will be needed at higher traffic volumes in the future. Additional domestic hub ports shall be developed as cargo demand increases over time. The results suggest that a progressive policy can be promising for infrastructure investments in developing countries: government planning and regulations may be introduced in early years to enhance infrastructure utilization and economic return. With increased demand the market may be liberalized to promote healthy competition.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract