Technological innovation is one of the potential engines to mitigate environmental pollution. However, the implementation of new technologies sometimes fails owing to socioeconomic constraints from different stakeholders. Thus, it is essential to analyze constraints of environmental technologies in order to build a pathway for their implementation. In this study, taking three technologies on rural sewage treatment in Hangzhou, China as a case study, i.e., wastewater treatment plant (WTP), constructed wetland (CW), and biogas system, we analyzed how socioeconomic constraints affect the technological choices. Results showed that socioeconomic constraints play a key role through changing the relative opportunity cost of inputs from government as compared to that of residents to deliver the public good-sewage treatment-under different economic levels. Economic level determines the technological choice, and the preferred sewage treatment technologies change from biogas system to CW and further to WTP along with the increase of economic level. Mismatch of technological choice and economic level results in failures of rural sewage treatment, e.g., the CW only work well in moderately developed regions in Hangzhou. This finding expands the environmental Kuznets law by introducing the coproduction theory into analysis (i.e., inputs from both government and residents are essential for the delivery of public goods and services such as good environmental quality). A match between technology and socioeconomic conditions is essential to the environmental governance.
Corrupt deals are commonly arranged by intermediaries. However, attempts to deter corruption pay little attention to the role of intermediaries in corrupt deals. This paper reports a laboratory bribery experiment on corruption designed to investigate how intermediaries with information about the lowest bribe that the official is willing to accept in a briber-initiated corrupt deal affect the effectiveness of the four-eyes-principle (FEP) on deterring corruption. We find that the introduction of the FEP significantly decreases the corruption level by increasing uncertainty. However, the presence of intermediaries with information completely offsets the positive effect of introducing the FEP on preventing corruption. Our findings suggest that further research on corruption should allow a more active role of intermediaries, and legislators should take the role of intermediaries into account when designing anti-corruption mechanisms.
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