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Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) al-Maqṣad al-Asnā fī Sharḥ Maʿānī Asmāʾ Allāh al-Ḥusnā (“The Highest Aim in Explaining the Meanings of God’s Most Beautiful Names”) is more than just a commentary on the ninety-nine names of God. In setting out to expound on a virtue ethical theory of the divine names, the Maqṣad in effect amounts to a sustained theological meditation upon one of the most fundamental paradoxes of monotheism: how to locate and affirm both divine incomparability (tanzīh) and comparability (tashbīh). In order to avoid any semblance of theological immanentism, or “the affirmation of God’s comparability” (tashbīh), al-Ghazālī begins by positing that an unbridgeable chasm, or irreducible “disparity” (tafāwut), separates the Lord from the servant. This chasm accounts for a disconnect not only between God’s unqualified Essence and the human being, but also between the transcendent meanings (maʿānī) that reside in the Essence and our limited apprehension of those transcendent meanings in the mind. At the same time, he insists that this chasm does not annul the ethical relevance and ontological reality of the attributes (taʿṭīl). Rather, the latter are somehow comparable (tashbīh) and do serve as prototype for human ethical conduct. In addressing this apparent paradox, al-Ghazālī’s Maqṣad exudes a palpable theological anxiety. This article explores the ways in which he addresses this theological conundrum by grounding his treatise in Ashʿarī theology and Sufi ethics. It closely analyses his cautious use of diction, hyper-systematised exegetical methodology, and staunch commitment to a set of hermeneutical principles which serve to undergird his virtue ethical theory of the divine names. Later generations of commentators picked up on al-Ghazālī’s theological anxiety, and critiqued the work for excessive immanentism (tashbīh), excessive transcendentalism (tanzīh), or excessive hermeneutical systematisation (takalluf).

Abū l-Ḥasan al-Shushtarī’s (d. 668/1269) heretofore unedited and unstudied treatise, “On the Limits [of Theology and Sufism]” (R. al-Quṣāriyya) is a succinct account of the celebrated Andalusī Sufi poet’s understanding of the relationship between discursive knowledge (ʿilm) of the rational Ashʿarite theologians, direct and unitive recognition (maʿrifa) of the Sufis, and verified knowledge (taḥqīq) of the monist Realizers. Following a broad discussion of the major trends in Sufism that form the background out of which Shushtarī emerges, this article analyzes the Quṣāriyya and presents a full English translation and Arabic edition of this text. The Quṣāriyya is a treatise on epistemology that was written in order to provide guidance to a disciple on how to respond to accusations of doctrinal heresy and deviation from the revealed Law. As such, it offers a window into Shushtarī’s thought as well as his understanding of his own place within the 7th/13th century Islamic intellectual tradition. The hierarchy of knowledge that he outlines represents an early response to the growing epistemological debates between what may be called “monotheist Ashʿarites,” “monist-inclined Sufis,” and fully fledged “monist Realizers.” The differences between these three perspectives lie in how each understands God’s bestowal of existence (ījād) and, consequently, the ontological status of the created realm. The Ashʿarites are “monotheists” because they inhabit an atomistic creation that actually exists by virtue of God’s existentiating command. For them, God transcends creation, and creation proves the existence of a transcendent Creator. The Sufis, for their part, incline toward the monists for whom God is the sole Reality, and for whom all else is nonexistent (ʿadam). However, they begin by affirming the logic of the Ashʿarite monotheist paradigm, and as they acquire direct recognition of God through spiritual purification, they assert that the Creator proves the existence of creation, because the latter is an “empty tent” sustained by the divine command. Finally, the “monist” Realizer maintains that nothing other than God exists. Having realized the truths that the theologians speculate about and that the Sufis begin to experience, the Realizers can engage, affirm, and refute both groups at their respective levels without committing to the cosmological doctrines of Ashʿarism, the ontological categories of Avicennan philosophy, or even the Sufi conception of the spiritual path to God.

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