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This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and dividend policy in Thailand in a sample of 1,927 observations over the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010]. The results show that Thai firms are more likely to pay dividends when they have higher ownership concentration or the largest shareholder is an institution and that firms pay higher dividends when the largest shareholder, especially an institution, holds more percentage of shares. It is also found that both the likelihood of paying dividends and the magnitude of dividend payouts increase (decrease) with higher institutional (individual) ownership, the findings mostly driven by the ownership of domestic investors.

This paper examines dividend policy of Thai listed companies over the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008]. The results show that larger and more profitable firms with higher free cash flows and retained earnings to equity tend to pay higher dividends. In addition, the evidence indicates that firms with higher growth opportunities, proxied by market-to-book ratio, tend to pay lower dividend payout ratio but higher dividend yield. Collectively, the findings from this paper provide much support for the free cash flow and life-cycle hypotheses. Further, it is found that financial leverage is positively related to dividend payouts, a finding which casts doubt whether Thai firms rely on debt to pay dividends.

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This study investigates the impact of ownership structure on dividend policies of listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange over the period [2007][2008][2009][2010][2011]. The results show that firms with higher ownership by the largest shareholder, ownership concentration, and government ownership are more likely to pay dividends. However, the probability of paying dividends decreases when institutions hold more shares. It is also found that the magnitude of dividend payouts has a positive relationship with the ownership by the largest shareholder, ownership concentration, and government ownership but a negative relationship with the ownership by institutions and foreign investors.