Two experiments compared the predictions of mental-models theory with a mental-logic theory. Results show that people do not make fallacious inferences predicted by mental-models theory but not predicted by mental-logic theory and that people routinely make many valid inferences predicted by mental-logic theory that should be too difficult on mental-models theory. Thus, the mental-logic theory accounts better for the data. A difference between the two theories concerning predictions about the order in which inferences are made was also investigated. The data clearly favor the mental-logic theory. It is argued that the mental-logic theory provides the more plausible description of the actual psychological processes in propositional reasoning.

The present cross-cultural study examined the relationship between deductive reasoning and creativity among college students (M age=20.4 yr., SD= .6) from Hong Kong (n=39) and the United States (n=38). Participants performed tasks designed to measure deductive reasoning, creative writing, and insight problem-solving, all in verbal form. No correlation was found between the performance for deductive reasoning and creativity as measured by creative writing. Insight problem-solving performance correlated significantly with that for both reasoning and creativity. Significant cultural differences favoring the American participants were only found on the creative writing and insight problem-solving tasks, both of which supposedly involve creative thinking. There seems to be cultural dependence for creativity but not for deductive reasoning which suggests a qualification of a strong cultural-relevance view positing pervasive cultural influences on human thinking processes.

This article examines whether a particular mental logic introduced by M. D. S. Braine, B. J. Reiser, and B. Rumain (1984) is a reasonably accurate model of people's logical routines for prepositional reasoning. Participants are presented with reasoning problems; to make their reasoning steps explicit, they write down, in order, everything they infer. The inferences predicted by the model are compared with participants' output. Three quarters of participants' responses were predicted, and 85%~90% of the time the output of the model's core inference rules was written down. To predict equally well, L. J. Rips's (1994) mental logic model would need to adopt some of our model's features. The data indicate several problems iri the mental models theory and cannot be explained by pragmatic reasoning schemas. Arguments against a mental logic are questioned.

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Four experiments examined the strategies that individuals develop in sentential reasoning. They led to the discovery of five different strategies. According to the theory proposed in the paper, each of the strategies depends on component tactics, which all normal adults possess, and which are based on mental models. Reasoners vary their use of tactics in ways that have no deterministic account. This variation leads different individuals to assemble different strategies, which include the construction of incremental diagrams corresponding to mental models, and the pursuit of the consequences of a single model step by step. Moreover, the difficulty of a problem (i.e., the number of mental models required by the premises) predisposes reasoners towards certain strategies. Likewise, the sentential connectives in the premises also bias reasoners towards certain strategies, e.g., conditional premises tend to elicit reasoning step by step whereas disjunctive premises tend to elicit incremental diagrams.