Predicting intermediate and multiple conclusions in propositional logic inference problems: Further evidence for a mental logic.

Abstract

This article examines whether a particular mental logic introduced by M. D. S. Braine, B. J. Reiser, and B. Rumain (1984) is a reasonably accurate model of people's logical routines for prepositional reasoning. Participants are presented with reasoning problems; to make their reasoning steps explicit, they write down, in order, everything they infer. The inferences predicted by the model are compared with participants' output. Three quarters of participants' responses were predicted, and 85%~90% of the time the output of the model's core inference rules was written down. To predict equally well, L. J. Rips's (1994) mental logic model would need to adopt some of our model's features. The data indicate several problems iri the mental models theory and cannot be explained by pragmatic reasoning schemas. Arguments against a mental logic are questioned.

Mental Models in Conditional Reasoning and Working Memory

“…Although the results support the general framework provided by mental models theory, this theory has been the object of many criticisms by the supporters of the mental logic hypothesis (Bonatti, 1994a,b;Braine et al, 1995;O'Brien, 1993;. Braine and O'Brien (1991) have put forward a theory of if which distinguishes between a lexical entry composed of two inference schemas (modus ponens and a schema for conditional Downloaded by [University of Saskatchewan Library] at 19:00 15 March 2015 proof) and a set of pragmatic principles.…”

When emotions improve reasoning: The possible roles of relevance and utility

“…While reasoning has traditionally been confined to the realm of logic (e.g., Braine et al, 1995), recent data suggest that reasoning should be modelled in a way that integrates a range of contextual factors in addition to, and sometimes rather than, logic (Evans, 2002). The present review focuses on the contribution to this debate of studies that have investigated the impact of emotion on reasoning.…”

“…While there are only few such studies, we show that their results are compatible with "utility" models that have placed people's perception of content utility and their motivation at the centre of the reasoning process. For a long time reasoning was assessed as a function of logical deduction: people's degree of rationality was defined as the extent to which they could resolve deductive reasoning problems where conclusions follow premises according to the rules classical of logic (e.g., Braine et al, 1995). According to traditional models the normative standard for reasoning is drawn directly from mathematics.…”

Influence factors for local comprehensibility of process models

“…A typical outcome in research on deductive reasoning research often is the use of frequency tables of the correct solutions to different logical arguments to better analyze how humans intuitively reason and to contrast their reasoning with formal logic (e.g. Beller and Spada, 2003;Braine et al, 1995). A major result of such studies is that humans do not necessarily reason logically but apply heuristics and are often subject to fallacies.…”