The two main influences leading to adoption at the individual consumer level are marketing communication and interpersonal communication. Although evidence of the effect of these two influences is abundant at the market level, there is a paucity of research documenting the simultaneous effect of both influences at the individual consumer level. Thus, the primary objective of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature by documenting the existence and magnitude of both influences at the customer level while controlling for unobserved temporal effects. The pharmaceutical industry provides an appropriate context to study this problem. It has been conjectured that adoption and usage patterns of a new drug by physicians—“contagion”—acts as a “consumption externality,” as it allows a given physician to learn about the efficacy and use of the drug. In addition, pharmaceutical companies target individual physicians via marketing activities such as detailing, sampling, and direct-to-consumer advertising. Our data contain the launch of a new drug from an important drug category. We chose two unrelated markets (Manhattan and Indianapolis) for our empirical analysis. We model an individual physician's decision to adopt a new drug in a given time period as a binary choice decision. This decision is modeled as a function of temporal trends (linear and quadratic) and individual physician-level contagion and marketing activity (both individual level and market level). Our contagion measure aggregates the adoption behavior of geographically near physicians for each physician in our sample. Our results from the Manhattan market indicate that both targeted communication and contagion have an effect on the individual physician's adoption decision. A major challenge is to rule out alternative explanations for the detected contagion effect. We therefore carry out a series of tests and show that this effect persists even after we control for the effects of time, individual salespeople, other marketing instruments, local market effects, and the effects of some institutional factors. We believe that our contagion effect arises because the consumption externality is stronger for geographically close physicians. We discuss some underlying processes that are probably giving rise to the contagion effect we detected. Finally, we compute the social multiplier of marketing and find it to be about 11%. We also use the estimated parameters to compare the relative effect of contagion and targeted marketing. We find that marketing plays a large (relative) role in affecting early adoption. However, the role of contagion dominates from month 4 onward and, by month 17 (or about half the duration of our data), asymptotes to about 90% of the effect.new product adoption, social networks, social interactions, contagion, word of mouth, hierarchical Bayesian methods, pharmaceutical industry

Are social media posts with pictures more popular than those without? Why do pictures with certain characteristics induce higher engagement than some other pictures? Using data sets of social media posts about major airlines and sport utility vehicle brands collected from Twitter and Instagram, the authors empirically examine the influence of image content on social media engagement. After accounting for selection bias on the inclusion of image content, the authors find a significant and robust positive mere presence effect of image content on user engagement in both product categories on Twitter. They also find that high-quality and professionally shot pictures consistently lead to higher engagement on both platforms for both product categories. However, the effect of colorfulness varies by product category, while the presence of human face and image–text fit can induce higher user engagement on Twitter but not on Instagram. These findings shed light on how to improve social media engagement using image content.

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This paper explores whether and how a firm should adapt its strategy in view of consumer use of prior customer ratings. Specifically, we consider optimal pricing and whether the firm should offer an unexpected frill to early customers to enhance their product experiences. We show that if price history is unobserved by consumers, a forward-looking firm should always modify its strategy from single-period optimal one, but it may be optimal to do so by lowering price, by lowering price and offering frills, or by raising price and offering frills, depending on the market growth rate. Specifically, the last strategy becomes optimal when market growth rate is high enough. The results are similar when the price history is observed by consumers, except that no deviation from single-period profit maximization choices is optimal when market growth is low enough. We also analyze whether the firm should prefer that the price information be stated in or left out of consumer reviews. In addition, in considering the effects of consumer heterogeneity, we conclude that the optimal firm's effort to affect ratings is higher when the idiosyncratic part of consumer uncertainty is larger.game theory, product augmentation, customer satisfaction, uncertainty, forward-looking behavior, pricing, customer ratings

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